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"YOU'D HAVE TO BE CRAZY TO WORK
HERE": WORKER STRESS, THE ABUSIVE
WORKPLACE, AND TITLE I OF THE ADA
Susan Stefan*
[Senator] Helms: Does an employer's own moral standards
enable him to make a judgment about any or all of the em-
ployees identified in our previous question?
[Senator] Harkin: Are you talking about transvestites?
Mr. Helms: Pardon?
Mr. Harkin: Are you talking about transvestites?
Mr. Helms: Right, or kleptomaniacs or manic depressives.
You said they are covered and that schizophrenics are cov-
ered as well.'
* Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law; A.B., Princeton
University, 1980; M. Phil, Cambridge University, 1981; J.D., Stanford Law
School, 1984. I acknowledge with gratitude the summer research grants of the
University of Miami School of Law, as well as the research assistance of Alan
Poppe, Catherine Contento, and Ben England. In addition I received outstand-
ing support from Sue Ann Campbell, heroine of Inter-Library Loan.
1. 135 CONG. REC. S10,765 (1989). The Congressional floor debate on the
Americans with Disabilities Act was marked by conspicuous, even fulsome, ar-
ticulations of concern for disabled individuals. See id. at S10,711 (referring to an"elderly grandmother with arthritis, but determined to fend for herself and live
her retirement years in dignity," the "proud American veteran, who risked life
but lost limb," the "young boy, born with Downs syndrome, but thanks to loving
parents and enlightened school officials, will graduate from high school")
(statement of Senator Harkin); see also id. at S10,716 ("My heart is with the
community of persons with disabilities.") (statement of Senator Hatch). The
only groups singled out for public opprobrium were people with psychiatric dis-
abilities, people with substance abuse problems, and people who were HIV-
positive or had AIDS. See id at S10,751 ("I have hired a lot of people in my
business career. What happens if somebody comes and has some mental infir-
mity?") (statement of Senator Boschwitz); see also id at S10,753 ("[T]he ideals of
our country certainly call upon the Senate to do whatever it can to be helpful to
people in wheelchairs or who have some kind of a physical disability .... What
concerns me is the thought that this disability [definition] might include some
things which by any ordinary definition we would not expect to be included ....
Mental disorders, such as alcohol withdrawal.... hallucinosis [sic] .... disillu-
sional disorder [sic].") (statement of Senator Armstrong); H.R. REP. No. 101-
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I. INTRODUCION
Despite widespread fear about extending the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA)' to protect people diagnosed with psychiatric
disabilities, most employment discrimination lawsuits brought by
people with psychiatric disabilities do not involve the kind of bizarre
behavior associated with stereotypes of mental illness. Nor are these
lawsuits instituted by people of marginal qualifications seeking to re-
tain employment by claiming discrimination.
Rather, in the vast majority of employment discrimination
cases involving people with actual or perceived psychiatric disabili-
ties, the employees tended to be highly qualified. Most worked a
considerable length of time, and their performances were "rated
highly"3 or "consistently rated as an above average to outstanding
worker."4 Some employees were "very successful[,] ... being named
the company's all-time profit producer,"5 "honored as Employee of
the Month,"6 or considered "'exceptional' ' '7 and "'fully successful."'
8
In other cases, the employee "won numerous awards for his work,"9
"performance evaluations were consistently good,"'" or, at the least,
the employee "received a 'meets standards' review on ... evalua-
tions.""
Many employees filing suit had significant academic or profes-
sional expertise. 2 Some were promoted at a rapid pace, which occa-
485, pt. 4, at 81 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 512, 564 ("Under the
ADA, would an employer be able to take prudent, prophylactic steps to control
an employee whose psychological profile suggests that he wants to murder his
fellow workers?") (dissenting views on the Americans with Disabilities Act). In
addition, various Representatives and Senators strove diligently to ensure that
the ADA could not be used to protect homosexuals. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485,
pt. 4, at 82, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 565 ("In particular, we believe that
the ADA is a homosexual rights bill in disguise.") (dissenting views on the
Americans with Disabilities Act).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
3. Simpkins v. Specialty Envelope, Inc., 94 F.3d 645 (table), No. 95-3370,
1996 WL 452858, at *1 (6th Cir. Aug. 9, 1996).
4. DiGloria v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., No. 92-1179-CIV-ORL-19, 1993
WL 735034, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 30, 1993).
5. Holihan v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 87 F.3d 362,364 (9th Cir. 1996).
6. Mundo v. Sanus Health Plan, 966 F. Supp. 171, 171 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
7. EEOC v. Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d 135, 138 (1st Cir. 1997).
8. Gonzagowski v. Widnall, 115 F.3d 744,746 (10th Cir. 1997).
9. McCrory v. Kraft Food Ingredients, 98 F.3d 1342 (table), No. 94-6505,
1996 WL 571146, at *1 (6th Cir. Oct. 3, 1996).
10. Hogarth v. Thomburgh, 833 F. Supp. 1077, 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
11. Hunt-Golliday v. Metropolitan Water Reclamation Dist., 104 F.3d 1004,
1012 (7th Cir. 1997).
12. See, e.g., Misek-Falkoff v. International Bus. Mach. Corp., 854 F. Supp.
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sionally precipitated the problem reflected in the litigation.' Other
times problems arose due to a change in employment14 or a promo-
tion to a supervisory position.15 Most often, however, an excellent
employee began to experience problems after the arrival of a new su-
pervisor.6
A review of hundreds of discrimination cases involving psychi-
atric disabilities'7 revealed employees whose claims typically fell into
one of four categories:
1. Employees who had worked satisfactorily for an extended
period of time until the appointment of a new supervisor and whose
claims clearly arose from escalating interpersonal difficulties with
their supervisors."
215, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) ("former college professor holding a Ph.D. degree with
a background in computers and linguistics... who is now an attorney"); see also
Fitzgerald v. Alleghany Corp., 904 F. Supp. 223, 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (senior vice
president); Remine v. Deckers, 871 F. Supp. 1538, 1539 (D. Conn. 1995) (director
of the Connecticut Cancer Institute and vice-chairman of the Department of
Surgery); Robertson v. Neuromedical Ctr., 983 F. Supp. 669 (M.D. La. 1997)
(former neurologist).
13. See, e.g., Mundo, 966 F. Supp. at 171-72; Lewis v. Zilog, Inc., 908 F. Supp.
931, 937 (N.D. Ga. 1995); Wood v. County of Alameda, No. C 94 1557 TEH, 1995
WL 705139, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 1995) (plaintiff had always received"satisfactory or better" evaluations until she was promoted to supervising clerk).
14. See, e.g., Anderson v. General Motors Corp., 991 F.2d 794 (table), No. 92-
2185, 1993 WL 94309, at *1 (6th Cir. Mar. 30, 1993).
15. See, e.g., Wisniewski v. Ameritech, No. 95 C 2340, 1996 WL 501737, at *1
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 1996).
16. See, e.g., Simpkins, 1996 WL 452858, at *1; DiGloria, 1993 WL 735034, at
*1.
17. The review involved looking at all cases charging employment discrimi-
nation on the basis of psychiatric disability, including cases brought under the
ADA, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1974, and a variety of state anti-
discrimination laws. The search included cases that were published in any form,
including the various disability law reporters-Americans with Disabilities
Cases, Americans with Disabilities Decisions, the National Disability Law Re-
porter, the Mental Health Law Reporter, and the Mental and Physical Disability
Law Reporter-as well as Westlaw and LEXIS, from July 26, 1992, when Title I
of ADA became effective, until December 1, 1997.
18. See, e.g., Siemon v. American Tel. & Tel. Corp., 117 F.3d 1173, 1174 (10th
Cir. 1997); Gonzagowski, 115 F.3d at 746; Weiler v. Household Fin. Corp., 101
F.3d 519, 522 (7th Cir. 1996); Crawford v. Runyon, 37 F.3d 1338, 1339 (8th Cir.
1994); Johnson v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 965 F.2d 31, 32 (5th Cir. 1992); Bar-
ton v. Tampa Elec. Co., No. 95-1986-CIV-T-17E, 1997 WL 128158, at *1 (M.D.
Fla. Mar. 11, 1997); Soileau v. Guilford of Maine, Inc., 928 F. Supp. 37, 43 (D.
Me. 1996), affd, 105 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1997); Hatfield v. Quantum Chem. Corp.,
920 F. Supp. 108, 109 (S.D. Tex. 1996); Boldini v. Postmaster Gen., 928 F. Supp.
125, 128 (D.N.H. 1995); Voytek v. University of Cal., No. C-92-3465 EFL, 1994
WL 478805, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 1994); DiGloria, 1993 WL 735034, at *1;
Mancini v. General Elec. Co., 820 F. Supp. 141,143 (D. Vt. 1993). In other cases,
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2. Employees whose psychiatric disabilities arose from other
work environment issues, including women who were sexually har-
assed;19 individuals subjected to hostile work environments as a result
of disability,' gender,2' race, or sexual preference;' whistleblowers 4
and people whose disabilities were related to other claims of em-
ployer abuse or unfair treatment.2
3. Employees whose disabilities were related to increasing
the employee had been working for several years before problems arose with a
new supervisor. See Pavone v. Brown, No. 95 C 3620, 1997 WL 441312, at *1
(N.D. IlM. July 29, 1997); McIntyre v. Kroger Co., 863 F. Supp. 355, 356, 359 n.12
(N.D. Tex. 1994); Kent v. Derwinski, 790 F. Supp. 1032, 1035-37 (E.D. Wash.
1991).
19. See, e.g., Iacampo v. Hasbro, Inc., 929 F. Supp. 562,568 (D.R.I. 1996).
20. This includes both physical and mental disabilities. It is not unusual for a
psychiatric disability claim to arise out of a claim of harassment for physical dis-
ability. See Williams v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 110 F.3d 74 (table), No. 96-6090,
1997 WL 158176, at *1 (10th Cir. Apr. 1, 1997) (psychiatric problems related to
exacerbation of lupus by job stress); Rivera-Flores v. Puerto Rico Tel. Co., 64
F.3d 742,744-45 (1st Cir. 1995) (plaintiff with cataracts and glaucoma harassed by
co-workers); Bryant v. Better Bus. Bureau, 923 F. Supp. 720, 727 (D. Md. 1996)
(deaf woman harassed based on disability and sex). Sometimes the harassment
claim related to the psychiatric disability itself. See McClain v. Southwest Steel
Co., 940 F. Supp. 295, 300 (N.D. Okla. 1996); Henry v. Guest Servs., Inc., 902 F.
Supp. 245, 251-52 (D.D.C. 1995) (plaintiff harassed about his depression), affd
mem., 98 F.3d 646 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Howard v. Navistar Int'l Trans. Corp., 904 F.
Supp. 922, 932 (E.D. Wis. 1995) (plaintiff whose supervisor called him a
"wussy"), aff'd mem., 107 F.3d 13 (7th Cir. 1997); Haysman v. Food Lion, Inc.,
893 F. Supp. 1092, 1098 (S.D. Ga. 1995) (supervisor told plaintiff he thought
plaintiff was "a 'joke'). Plaintiffs whose psychiatric disability stem from har-
assment about a physical disability are more successful in their cases than plain-
tiffs who claim to be harassed due to their psychiatric disability. Compare Riv-
era-Flores, 64 F.3d at 749, with Henry, 902 F. Supp. at 251-52.
21. See, e.g., Hunt-Golliday, 104 F.3d at 1008; Webb v. Baxter Healthcare
Corp., 57 F.3d 1067 (table), No. 94-1784, 1995 WL 352485, at *5 & n.6 (4th Cir.
June 13, 1995) (ADA claim dismissed because "whatever emotional problems
[plaintiff] had were the result, rather than the cause, of her hostile work envi-
ronment").
22. See, e.g., Barefield v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., No. C86-2427 TEH, 1997 WL
9888, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 2, 1997) (noting that emotional distress stemmed from
hostile work environment based on race).
23. Usually the harassment is based on co-workers' or supervisors' assump-
tions about sexual preference. See Ralph v. Lucent Techs., Inc., No. 97-1963,
1998 WL 29837, at *2 (1st Cir. Feb. 2, 1998); Kaufman v. Checkers Drive-In Res-
taurants, Inc., 122 F.3d 892, 893 (11th Cir. 1997); Hatfield, 920 F. Supp. at 109.
24. See, e.g., Wagner v. Texas A&M Univ., 939 F. Supp. 1297 (S.D. Tex. 1996)
(involving retaliation in violation of the Texas Whistleblower Act).
25. See, e.g., Collins v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 103 F.3d 35, 36 (6th Cir. 1996)
(involving work-related stress); Simpkins, 1996 WL 452858, at *1, 8; Mundo, 966
F. Supp. at 171; Mears v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 905 F. Supp. 1075, 1077
(S.D. Ga. 1995), affd mem., 87 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir. 1996); Anderson, 1993 WL
94309, at *1.
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stress, increased hours on the job, or the demands of new positions or
new responsibilities.' These people often requested, and were de-
nied, accommodations considered reasonable by the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),V including modified work
schedules involving limited overtime, no night shifts, transfers, or
leaves of absence. 28
4. Employees disciplined for misconduct, usually sexual harass-
ment, who claimed that their behavior resulted from a mental disabil-
ity or that being disciplined showed that their employer perceived
them as being mentally disabled.29
These cases undermine a number of public and media assump-
tions about employees with psychiatric disabilities and the ADA.
First, although there has been widespread focus on employees in the
fourth category as the primary beneficiaries of the ADA, case law re-
26. See, e.g., Beck v. University of Wisc. Bd. of Regents, 75 F.3d 1130 (7th
Cir. 1996); Morton v. GTE N. Inc., 922 F. Supp. 1169, 1173 (N.D. Tex. 1996)
(employee began employment with defendant in 1969 and became depressed due
to increased job stress in 1985), affd mer.., 114 F.3d 1182 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
118 S. Ct. 205 (1997); Wisniewski, 1996 WL 501737, at *1 (involving employee
promoted to supervisor).
27. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) (1997).
28. See, e.g., Scott v. American Airlines, Inc., No. 3:95-CV-1393-R, 1997 WL
278129 (N.D. Tex. May 15, 1997); Simmerman v. Hardee's Food Sys., Inc., No.
CIV. A. 94-6906, 1996 WL 131948 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 22, 1996), affd mem., 118 F.3d
1578 (3d Cir. 1997). The plaintiff in Simmerman requested an accommodation
that his work hours be limited to 40 per week and he not be required to work
night shifts. See id. at *1. However, the court found that working more than 50
hours a week and working both shifts was an "essential element" of managing
the fast food restaurant. See id. at *5.
29. See, e.g., Graehling v. Village of Lombard, III., 58 F.3d 295, 298 (7th Cir.
1995) (employee alleged he was coerced into resigning because, in part, of bipo-
lar depression and post-traumatic stress syndrome); Fenton v. Pritchard Corp.,
926 F. Supp. 1437, 1441-42 (D. Kan. 1996) (employee was fired after he stalked,
harassed, and assaulted co-worker); Bunevith v. CVS/Pharmacy, 925 F. Supp. 89,
94 (D. Mass. 1996) (plaintiff fired for violating sexual harassment policies); Bid-
die v. Rubin, No. 95 C 1505, 1996 WL 14001, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 9, 1996)
(employee charged with sexual harassment who claimed employer regarded him
as psychiatrically disabled because he was called delusional); Miles v. General
Serv. Admin., No. CIV. A. 94-1945, 1995 WL 766013, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 27,
1995) (employee with carpal tunnel syndrome, diabetes, and depression fired for
sexual harassment, intoxication at work, insubordination, and repeated ab-
sences); Mustafa v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 876 F. Supp. 1177, 1179 (D. Nev.
1995) (teacher accused of sexual misconduct); Gordon v. Runyon, No. CIV.A.
93-0037, 1994 WL 139411, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 21, 1994) (employee discharged
for assaulting a nurse, possessing mace and a stun gun, and disruptive behavior);
Klein v. Boeing Co., 847 F. Supp. 838, 843 (W.D. Wash. 1994) (employee dis-
charged because of sex crime conviction and not because of disability).
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veals that employees in the first and second categories predominate.
Second, although the ADA is seen as a vehicle to open the
workplace to people with pre-existing disabilities, in the vast majority
of cases the disability appeared to be triggered or greatly exacerbated
by aspects of the workplace environment that could have easily been
remedied, but were not. The majority of cases suggest that society is
losing valuable, skilled, and dedicated employees because employers
are unwilling to accommodate psychiatric disabilities and courts have
failed to enforce employers' obligation to do so. The employees who
litigate these ADA cases could and did work for many years. Instead
of an accommodation, many of them now receive disability benefits
at enormous social and economic cost.
Third, only a few cases reflect employee behavior corresponding
to social stereotypes of mental illness.-" Likewise, few ADA cases re-
veal employers who exhibited stereotypical discriminatory attitudes
towards individuals with psychiatric disabilities, such as assuming that
such individuals would be violent or dangerous or simply refusing to
hire them because of their psychiatric diagnoses.3' Many of the cases,
however, do reveal abusive or stressful work environments with very
long hours and bullying supervisors. Employers' attitudes toward the
impact of these conditions on employees with psychiatric disabilities
mirrors past attitudes toward the employment of women and minori-
ties: as long as such employees fit into the workplace culture and do
not demand that it change, they will be accepted.
The employers in these cases are generally unwilling to grant
employees with psychiatric disabilities the kinds of workplace ac-
commodations that would enable them to continue to work. This is
particularly striking because the requested accommodations are
30. See, e.g., Carrozza v. Howard County, Md., 45 F.3d 425 (table), No. 94-
1593, 1995 WL 8033, at *1 (4th Cir. Jan. 10, 1995) (employee emptied trash bag
on table during meeting); Solomon v. New York City Bd. of Educ., No. CV-95-
1878, 1996 WL 118541, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 1996) (plaintiff claiming medical
conspiracies against her); Lassiter v. Reno, 885 F. Supp. 869, 871 (E.D. Va. 1995)
(plaintiff with delusional paranoid personality who believed elderly neighbor was
conspiring to burglarize his home), affd mem., 86 F.3d 1151 (4th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 766 (1997); Hogarth, 833 F. Supp. at 1080 (FBI clerk handed
out blank doctor's notes which he signed in the name of non-existent doctor).
31. But see McCrory, 1996 WL 571146, at *6 (noting that supervisor stated he
"was 'uncomfortable' with plaintiff talking to customers while plaintiff was on
[antidepressant] medication"); Stradiley v. LaFourche Communications, Inc., 869
F. Supp. 442, 444 (E.D. La. 1994) ("Based on his 'general life experiences,'
[plaintiff's supervisor] believed that [plaintiff's] condition [of acute anxiety and
depression] made him potentially violent and hostile in the workplace.").
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common personnel practices routinely adopted in other circum-
stances. For example, employers refuse to transfer employees under
the supervision of particular supervisors although the practice is well-
established in sexual harassment cases; in several cases, such transfers
were accomplished when the supervisor, rather than the employee,
requested it.' Moreover, some employers refuse to permit employ-
ees to work "normal" work weeks,33 even though part-time work, es-
pecially for new mothers, is becoming commonplace.
While management consultants increasingly counsel employers
to treat workers with respect, few ADA cases involve employers who
were willing to admonish abusive supervisors or insist on a workplace
environment of civility. Employers' unwillingness to accommodate
psychiatrically disabled employees is not a question of economics;
many employers are far more willing to pay employees psychiatric
disability benefits than to transfer them to a new supervisor. Some
employers, for example, have fought disability discrimination cases
by arguing that the employee is not disabled and then urging, en-
couraging, or forcing the employee to retire on disability benefits.'
32. See Misek-Falkoff, 854 F. Supp. at 219.
33. Most requests for lower hours made by employees in ADA cases involve
requests to work 40, 50, and 60 hour work weeks instead of what they have been
working. See, e.g., Williams, 1997 WL 158176, at *2 (plaintiff's doctor recom-
mended plaintiff "limit work days to ten hours including travel"); Brown v.
Northern Trust Bank, No. 95 C 7559, 1997 WL 543098, at *1-2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 2,
1997) (plaintiff requested overtime hours reduced and that she be allowed to
work "'normal hours'); Kolpas v. G.D. Searle & Co., 959 F. Supp. 525, 527-28
(N.D. Ill. 1997) (request that working time be reduced from 60 to 70 hours per
week to 40 hours per week); Amy Stevens, Boss's Brain Teaser: Accommodating
Depressed Worker, WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 1995, at B1 (reporting the case of Put-
nam v. Pacific Gas & Electric, No. C-9403558-WHO (N.D. Cal. 1995) in which an
attorney with depression was awarded $300,000 under state anti-discrimination
statute after being denied accommodation of one-half-day off every time he
worked more than 45 hours in two consecutive weeks); Long Hours Necessary in
Many Jobs-But is it an Essential Function?, DISABILITY COMPLIANCE BULL. 3
(Mar. 14, 1996). Several newspapers reported the case of Santo Alba, a foreman
at Raytheon who was working 70-80 hours a week when his supervisor told him
his workload would increase again. That afternoon, Alba apparently stuck his
head into a giant circular saw used to cut sheet metal and was decapitated. The
family filed a complaint with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimi-
nation, claiming that the company knew Alba was diagnosed with manic-
depression and did nothing to lower his hours. See Audrey Choi, Family of Sui-
cide Victim Claims Raytheon Drove Him to Death, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 1995, at
B14.
34. See, e.g., Cadelli v. Fort Smith Sch. Dist., 23 F.3d 1295, 1297 (8th Cir.
1994) (noting that the principal told a teacher that his course load could not be
reduced without unduly disrupting the school, but suggested at the same time
that the teacher take sick leave for the rest of the year); Misek-Falkoff, 854 F.
April 1998)
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Employers' unwillingness to accommodate psychiatrically dis-
abled employees is also not the result of willful or malingering em-
ployees with diagnoses suggesting only mild impairments such as ad-
justment disorders; most employees who file suit are in fact
diagnosed with one of the so-called "serious mental illnesses" such as
depression, bipolar disorder, or schizophrenia and its milder vari-
ants. 5 Rather, employers are simply unwilling to transfer supervisors
or employees as an accommodation for psychiatric disability.
Thus, the vast majority of ADA psychiatric disability claims en-
compass more than employees exhibiting bizarre behavior or em-
ployers indulging in gross stereotypes. Rather, ADA cases involving
psychiatric disabilities raise issues at the heart of the employment
relationship: the scope of permissible behavior of supervisors toward
employees; the extent to which tolerance of stress is an "essential
function"36 of either a given job or employment in general; and the
extent to which a worker is expected to tolerate insensitivity or abuse
by supervisors or co-workers. ADA psychiatric disability claims fo-
cus increasingly on the balance between what employees must endure
in a "normal" work environment-or risk being held unqualified for
employment-and what employers must change about work envi-
ronments-or risk being held not to have reasonably accommodated
an employee with a psychiatric disability.
Plaintiffs with psychiatric disabilities almost always lose ADA
discrimination cases, despite EEOC regulations and guidance requir-
ing employers to adjust supervisory methods, or permit employees to
work fewer hours, or work different shifts if feasible." This is be-
cause courts reflexively assume that conditions which preclude peo-
Supp. at 221 (involving plaintiff placed on mandatory disability retirement).
35. See, e.g., Blankenship v. Martin Marietta Energy Sys., Inc., 83 F.3d 153,
154-55 (6th Cir. 1996) (schizophreniform disorder); Tyler v. Runyon, 70 F.3d 458,
460 (7th Cir. 1995) (paranoid schizophrenia); Brefland v. Advance Circuits, Inc.,
976 F. Supp. 858, 859-62 (D. Minn. 1997) (major depression, schizoid personality
disorder, and severe psychological stress); Kemer v. Johnson, 900 F. Supp. 677,
679 & n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (depressive neurosis and schizotypal personality dis-
order), affd mem., 101 F.3d 683 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 441 (1996); Pa-
tridge v. Runyon, 899 F. Supp. 291,292 (N.D. Tex. 1995) (schizophrenia).
36. Under the ADA, a plaintiff must be a "qualified individual with a disabil-
ity." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). A qualified individual is "an individual with a disabil-
ity who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential
functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires." Id. §
12111(8).
37. See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Americans with Dis-
abilities Act and Psychiatric Disabilities, in 2A AMERICANS wiTH DISABILITIES
PRACrICE AND COMPLIANCE MANUAL 101-02 (Supp. 1998) (EEOC Enforce-
ment Guidance) [hereinafter PRACTICE AND COMPLIANCE MANUAL].
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ple with psychiatric disabilities from being successful are necessary
elements of the workplace. While courts understand that accessible
workplaces may require teletypewriters or ramps, and that neither
sexual harassment nor race discrimination is an employer preroga-
tive, stress, punishing hours, overwork, unpleasant personality con-
flicts, and even worker abuse are much more commonly seen as sim-
ply intrinsic features of the workplace." As Regina Austin notes:
It is generally assumed that employers and employees alike
agree that some amount of such abuse is a perfectly natural,
necessary, and defensible prerogative of superior rank ....
Workers for their part are expected to respond to psycho-
logically painful supervision with passivity, not insubordina-
tion and resistance. They must and do develop stamina and
resilience.39
But what about the worker who is exceptionally qualified to per-
form a given job, but who is not gifted with the "stamina and resil-
ience" to cope with stress or abuse in the workplace? Numerous
cases brought by employees with psychiatric disabilities raise issues
such as being screamed at, assaulted, or treated unfairly by supervi-
sors,4 or continual mocking or mistreatment by co-workers.41  In
38. See Regina Austin, Employer Abuse, Worker Resistance, and the Tort of
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1, 1 (1988).
39. Id. at 1-2.
40. See Ralph v. Lucent Technologies, Inc., No. 97-1963, 1998 WL 29837, at
*1 (1st Cir. Feb. 2, 1998); Pavone v. Brown, No. 95 C 3620, 1997 WL 441312, at *2
(N.D. Ill. July 29, 1997); Barton, 1997 WL 128158, at *1 ("[p]laintiff [who] al-
lege[d] that she was not permitted to ask more than two (2) questions during
training sessions, not allowed to use the restroom when needed, not allowed to
take breaks so that she could take her medication, and constantly called into her
supervisor's office and criticized"); Dewitt v. Carsten, 941 F. Supp. 1232, 1234
(N.D. Ga. 1996) (supervisor "scolded and yelled at plaintiff"), affd mem., 122
F.3d 1079 (11th Cir. 1997); Kotlowski v. Eastman Kodak Co., 922 F. Supp. 790,
800 (W.D.N.Y. 1996); DiGloria, 1993 WL 735034, at *1 (plaintiff alleged that su-
pervisor "repeatedly harassed her and on occasion verbally assaulted her in an
aggressive and confrontational manner"); Kent v. Derwinski, 790 F. Supp. 1032,
1037 (E.D. Wash. 1991) (mentally disabled worker's supervisor would "lecture
Ms. Kent for up to two hours on getting along with co-workers... ordering Ms.
Kent to stand against the wall and not work, grabing Ms. Kent's arm in the re-
stroom and ordering her to keep silent about the conditions in the laundry, and
criticizeing Ms. Kent for her behavior, which was due to her handicap").
41. See Ralph, 1998 WL 29837, at *2 (making the plaintiff the butt of sexually
derisive jokes); McClain, 940 F. Supp. at 300 ("Co-workers allegedly referred to
Mr. McClain as 'crazy' and/or as 'a lunatic' and talked about people on Prozac or
going to the mental health facility in Vinita, Oklahoma. Plaintiff further alleges
that his supervisor... was 'hateful' and asked him 'what the f***'s wrong with
you."'); Muller v. Automobile Club, 897 F. Supp. 1289, 1291 (S.D. Cal. 1995)
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some cases, the complaints involve working conditions which most
people, including the judges deciding the cases, would acknowledge
as unfair2 a violation of standards of behavior in the workplace,43 or
even intolerable.44 In other cases, work stress arises not from inter-
personal conflicts but from an employee working fifty to seventy
hour weeks,45 double shifts, or night shifts.'
Courts cite three principal justifications for ruling against plain-
tiffs in these cases, corresponding to the elements of a prima facie
case under the ADA. First, courts often conclude that a plaintiff is
not disabled because his or her claimed disability results from stress,
abuse, or difficulties with a supervisor. Even if the plaintiff is hospi-
talized-and despite EEOC enforcement guidance that interacting
with others is a major life activity--most courts hold as a matter of
law that conditions arising from an interpersonal conflict at work or
(after plaintiff's life was threatened repeatedly by customer, co-workers asked
her if she was wearing her "target," permitted the customer on company prop-
erty, and told plaintiff they had informed customer where she lived and what
kind of car she drove); Kent, 790 F. Supp. at 1036 (co-workers called plaintiff
"brain-dead" and "droolie"); see also Howard, 904 F. Supp. at 932
(characterizing co-worker harassment); Henry, 902 F. Supp. at 252 (plaintiff
subjected to jokes about his depression, including the placement of a cartoon in
his mailbox); Haysman, 893 F. Supp. at 1098 (discussing friction that developed
as a result of disability).
42. See Simpkins, 1996 WL 452858, at *8.
43. See Webb v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 57 F.3d 1067 (table), No. 94-1784,
1995 WL 352485, at *5 (4th Cir. June 13, 1995).
44. See Sedor v. Frank, 42- F.3d 741, 743 (2nd Cir. 1994) (stating that
"insensitivity on the part of fellow employees 'barely reached tolerable maturity
levels for junior high students') (citation omitted); Pavone, 1997 WL 441312, at
*8; Hatfield, 920 F. Supp. at 109; Kent, 790 F. Supp. at 1040-41.
45. See Williams, 1997 WL 158176, at *1 (involving doctor who recommended
that employee limit her work days to 10 hours); Kolpas v. Searle, 959 F. Supp.
525, 527 (N.D. IM. 1997) (requiring employee to work at least 60 to 70 hour
weeks); Simmerman, 1996 WL 131948, at *1 (depressed employee not qualified
to perform the essential functions of managing a fast food restaurant because he
could only work the day shift and not more than 40 hours per week); Mazzarella
v. United Parcel Serv., 849 F. Supp. 89, 91-92 (D. Mass 1994) (noting that plain-
tiff, by his own choice, worked six or seven days a week, eight hours a day, but
testified "that such a schedule was probably not good for his 'balance"').
46. Webb v. Mercy Hosp., 102 F.3d 958, 959 (8th Cir. 1996) (nurse unable to
work night shift). Because of the effects of some psychotropic medications, some
workers who take these drugs find it extremely difficult to work night shifts or
begin work early in the morning. See PRACTICE AND COMPLIANCE MANUAL,
supra note 37, at 101.
47. See PRACrICE AND COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 37, at 91. How-
ever, the EEOC notes that an individual "is not substantially limited just because
[he or she] is irritable or has some trouble getting along with a supervisor or co-
worker." Id at 91 n.15.
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job-related stress cannot be considered a disability for the purposes
of the ADA*14
Second, courts conclude that the ability to withstand stressful
work conditions or the ability to get along with others is so essential
to the job that the plaintiff cannot be considered a qualified individ-
ual with a disability.49 Courts make abstract judgments that job stress
and getting along with others are simply inherent to employment
without examining each situation in the individualized terms required
by the ADA. Courts, therefore, do not determine the source of the
stress or interpersonal difficulties or whether, in the plaintiffs situa-
tion, that particular stressor is indeed essential to the plaintiff's actual
job.'
Third, courts either refuse to consider or simply deny plaintiffs'
proffered reasonable accommodations.51 Although the ADA re-
quires courts to consider whether reasonable accommodations could
render an employee qualified,' courts deem accommodations such as
transfer or reduction in hours to be unreasonable in psychiatric dis-
ability cases even though they are routinely granted in other disabil-
ity cases. No court, however, has required an employer to show that
abusive or stressful practices are so necessary to the job that eliminat-
ing them would "fundamentally alter" the actual job being done.
This Article is divided into four parts. Parts II and III track the
elements of an ADA claim, arguing that judicial assumptions about
the nature of psychiatric disabilities and essential employment func-
tions have resulted in the near-total failure of the ADA to protect
individuals with psychiatric disabilities from employment discrimina-
tion. Part IV proposes a solution to this problem focusing on the
ADA's prohibition of practices that have a disparate impact on peo-
ple with disabilities.
48. See infra notes 95-124 and accompanying text. The only judge who ap-
pears to have a different understanding is Judge Richard Posner. See infra text
accompanying notes 122-24.
49. See infra notes 124-42 and accompanying text.
50. See infra notes 143-85 and accompanying text.
51. See Ralph, 1998 WL 29837, at *6-7; Lewis, 908 F. Supp. at 946 (finding
that "[p]laintiff's requested accommodation of a transfer [was] unreasonable as a
matter of law"); Mazzarella, 849 F. Supp. at 95; Mancini, 820 F. Supp. at 148 (D.
Vt. 1993) (involving invalid request for transfer).
52 See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
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II. DEFINING DISABILITY AND THE EXCLUSION OF WORKERS WITH
PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITIES FROM THE PROTECTION OF THE ADA
In order to establish a claim under Title I of the ADA, a plaintiff
must show that he or she is disabled, qualified for the job, and dis-
criminated against on the basis of a disability.53 The ADA defines
disability as: "[1] a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; [2] a
record of such an impairment; or [3] being regarded as having such an
impairment.""
The first and most common rationale used by courts in dismiss-
ing employment discrimination claims brought by employees claim-
ing to have a psychiatric disability is that the employee is in fact not
disabled under the ADA. The reason advanced by courts for this
conclusion is not based on the absence of serious manifestations of
disability, as many plaintiffs are hospitalized, on medication, and un-
der the care of one or more doctors and specialists. Rather, courts
conclude as a matter of law that disabilities that plaintiffs allege are
caused by workplace abuse, interpersonal conflicts, and job stress
simply are not disabilities for purposes of the ADA.
A. Workplace Abuse and Interpersonal Conflicts on the Job
Almost all law review articles written about abuse in the work-
place focus specifically on abuse related to race or gender.55 Vast
compendia are written about labor law that do not contain a single
word about abuse in the workplace. At the same time, case law and
the popular press, books, and oral histories by and about workers56
53. See id. § 12112.
54. 1d § 12102(2).
55. Regina Austin provides one notable exception. See Austin, supra note
38, at 1-5. A few authors responded to her suggestion that the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress be expanded to render employers more frequently
liable for abuse in the workplace. See David P. Duffy, Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress and Employment at Will: The Case Against "Tortification" of
Labor and Employment Law, 74 B.U. L. REV. 387, 390-91 (1994). Other authors
have written on workplace harassment based on a person's disability-rather
than day-to-day abuse directed at all employees. See, e.g., Frank S. Ravitch, Be-
yond Reasonable Accommodation: The Availability and Structure of a Cause of
Action for Workplace Harassment Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 15
CARDOZO L. REV. 1475 (1994).
56. See, e.g., Rosalyn Baxandall & Linda Gordon, AMERICA'S WORKING
WOMEN: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1600 TO THE PRESENT (1995); Joe R.
Feagin & Melvin P. Sikes, LIVING WTH RACISM: THE BLACK MIDDLE-CLASS
EXPERIENCE (1994).
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are filled with stories indicating both the extent to which workplace
abuse is common and the toll it takes on workers. For example,
every year the organization "9 to 5" sponsors a "worst boss" conteste
which receives thousands of entries, including:
[a] manufacturing company [that] demand[ed] mandatory
overtime, making some employees work 16 hours a day,
seven days a week, then force[d] all employees to take their
two-week vacations at the end of May, when most kids
[were] still in school. The plant [was not] air-conditioned,
but workers [were] forbidden to drink water unless on an
authorized break. 8
Other entries included a boss whose response to an employee's
request for bereavement leave following a miscarriage late in her
pregnancy was to demand the baby's death certificate, 9 and an em-
ployee who "raced home [from work] to her hysterical children and
found the baby sitter dead on the sofa" and was then ordered back to
work by her employer, who said "she was of more use to him than to
the nanny."' 6
These stories are extreme but not necessarily aberrant. Social
science researchers confirm that workplace abuse is common. Re-
searchers underscore that, despite losing a great deal of productivity,
the American workplace is permeated with "'an organizational per-
versity where abusers are often protected and the victims pun-
ished.' 61 In a television show about mothers on welfare going back
to work, one repentant woman explained why she had lost two jobs
since returning to work and would now be able to retain the third be-
cause of the lessons she had learned:
I guess I've been out of the work field too long to realize
that if the boss screams at you for no reason or if he says
something that's his way, whether you're right or wrong, it
doesn't matter; it's the boss, and that's what I consider the
business politics that I've learned on the past two jobs, so
57. See Tamara Jones, A Real Piece of Work- 'Worst Boss' Contest Lets Em-
ployees Vent, WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 1997, at B1.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. Id. The story also detailed a boss who "[i]n addition to routinely
screaming insults and throwing trays of hot food at the employee... forced her
to clean the floors with a toothbrush and crawl through a Dumpster to find a
burned biscuit when she was seven months pregnant." Id-
61. Id. (quoting Dr. Harvey Hornstein of Columbia University, who studied
more than a thousand workers over eight years).
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I'm ready for my third and my last. 2
An article in The Indiana Lawyer noted casually: "Leadership
styles vary greatly, of course. We've all had bosses who were
screamers . ... "6 One article in the wake of the controversy sur-
rounding basketball player Latrell Sprewell's attack on his coach"
observed:
One of the dirty little secrets of the American workplace-
and a mostly overlooked wrinkle in the firing of basketball
player Latrell Sprewell-is the so-called "screamer," a boss
who feels at liberty to berate and belittle his employees
even if he feels constrained by law or political correctness
from making sexual advances or using racial epithets.'5
The cases brought by plaintiffs with psychiatric disabilities under
the ADA mirror these observations. Courts' generalizations that the
ability to cope with virtually any level of stress is essential to main-
taining employment in this country often insulate levels of abuse or
extreme working conditions unnecessary to any job's function. The
stories told by plaintiffs range from physical assault by supervisors"
and limitations on use of the restroom6 7 to repeated harassment and
criticism."
Kotlowski v. Eastman Kodak Co." is a fairly representative case
in its seamless intertwining of gender and disability issues. Kot-
lowski's supervisor "berated her for her professional shortcomings
and told her she had fallen through the cracks. [He] hovered around
her cubicle, making her feel very nervous and pressured. He would
sometimes tell her that stress was good for her."70 When Kotlowski
attempted to approach him with medical concerns, "he told [her] that
62. The News Hour with Jim Lehrer (PBS television broadcast, Oct. 10, 1997)
(comments of Renee Lawrence).
63. George A. Buskirk, Jr., Leadership in a Legal Organization, INDIANA
LAW., Nov. 12, 1997, at 17.
64. See Jonathan Kirsch, The Screamer and His Fire Within, L.A. TIMEs, Dec.
14, 1997, at M5.
65. Id.
66. See Hatfield v. Quantum Chemical Corp., 920 F. Supp. 108, 109 (S.D. Tex.
1996).
67. See Barton v. Tampa Elec. Co., No. 95-1986-CIV-T-17E, 1997 WL 128158,
at *1 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 11, 1997).
68. See DiGloria v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., No. 92-1179-CIV-ORL-19,
1993 WL 735034 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 30, 1993).
69. 922 F. Supp. 790 (W.D.N.Y. 1996).
70. Id. at 800 (citations omitted).
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she was a hypochondriac."71 He also "repeatedly commented that the
length of [her] skirts was too short, that she should dress more con-
servatively, and that people would perceive her in a negative 
way. ' ' n
Other psychiatric disability cases arise out of workplace harass-
ment over perceived homosexuality. One of the more extreme ex-
amples of these cases-which may now be prosecuted as sex dis-
crimination cases-is Hatfield v. Quantum Chemicals.74 Hatfield's
supervisor harassed him continually. In particular, the plaintiff al-
leged that his supervisor
would sometimes summon [him] by calling him "pussy." In
the spring of 1992, Hatfield had injured his back on the job.
When he approached the supervisor about getting time off
to see a chiropractor, the supervisor responded by telling
Hatfield to get underneath his desk and perform oral sex on
him. The supervisor then laughed and walked off. In May
of 1992, Hatfield was standing by a water fountain when the
supervisor grabbed the back of his head and pulled it toward
the supervisor's groin and asked if he was ready to perform
oral sex on him:'
These kinds of stories are also found in ADA claims brought by
people with physical disabilities,76 whose co-workers often taunt them
by calling them mentally disabled.77 In Rivera v. Domino's Pizza,
Inc. ,78 Rivera's co-workers and supervisors mocked his speech defect
and cleft palate and lip by calling him "a numskull" and "retarded,"
and they told Domino's customers that he had been hired from a lo-
cal facility for mentally handicapped people and that "the reason




73. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998).
74. 920 F. Supp. 108 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
75. Id. at 109.
76. The difference is that plaintiffs with physical disabilities-even physical
disabilities about which some are skeptical-often win their challenges of work-
place abuse. See, e.g., Goodman v. Boeing Co., 899 P.2d 1265, 1267 (Wash. 1995)
(involving plaintiff with carpal tunnel syndrome who won $1.1 million).
77. Rivera-Flores v. Puerto Rico Tel. Co., 64 F.3d 742,744 (1st Cir. 1995) (co-
workers and supervisors called woman with cataracts and glaucoma "'little blind
lady,' 'mentally retarded,' 'mutant,' cross-eyed, and physically repulsive[,] and
hid or defaced her paperwork"); Williams v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 110 F.3d 74
(table), No. 96-6090, 1997 WL 158176 (10th Cir. Apr. 1, 1997) (plaintiffs psychi-
atric problems related to exacerbation of lupus by job stress).
78. No. CIV. A. 95-1378, 1996 WL 53802 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 9, 1996).
79. Id. at *1 (citations omitted).
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The cases often concern supervisors who curse, yell, or scream at
their employees.' ° Neither the employer nor the courts, however,
consider the screaming supervisor the problem in these situations.8'
As one author recently wrote:
some bosses feel empowered to treat their subordinates with
a degree of coarseness, contempt and cruelty that would be
unthinkable in any other social setting. I observed that
screamers are often coddled and even encouraged within
the corporate culture if they are successful at making money
for the company .... Screamers are still tolerated in work-
places where sexual advances and racial epithets are now
forbidden.u
The reactions of psychiatrically vulnerable employees to this
kind of treatment tend to vary.n Some get angry and are fired for
being "insubordinate"' and some break down and leave and are fired
for leaving work without notifying their immediate supervisorsY
Neither response is acceptable to the employer or the courts. As
outlined in the next two sections, courts either find that these plain-
tiffs cannot be disabled as a matter of law or that their anger or
breakdowns render them unqualified for employment. Courts reject
outright any suggestion that the employer might have an obligation
to either create a more respectful environment or, at least, transfer
the employee.
In fact, one of the concerns raised by defendants and their amici
80. See, e.g., Curry v. Empire Berol, 134 F.3d 370 (table), No. 97-5012, 1998
WL 13407, at *1 (6th Cir. Jan. 7, 1998) (supervisor cursed at employee); Dewitt v.
Carsten, 941 F. Supp. 1232, 1234 (N.D. Ga. 1996) (supervisor "scolded and yelled
at plaintiff"), affd mem., 122 F.3d 1079 (11th Cir. 1997).
81. See Curry, 1998 WL 13407 at *4 (holding plaintiff failed to state a claim);
Dewitt, 941 F. Supp. at 1241 (granting defendant's motion for partial summary
judgment).
82. Kirsch, supra note 64, at M5.
83. Unfortunately for those who might have hoped that the advent of women
in positions of authority might make for a kinder, gentler workplace, I have not
been able to detect any gender-specific pattern of allegations of abuse or harass-
ment at work. That is, although a substantial number of the cases are brought by
women or minorities, both men and women are portrayed as abusive supervisors
by employees of both genders. The stories seem to have far more to do with
workplace cultures of hierarchy and authority than gender.
84. See, e.g., Mancini v. General Elec. Co., 820 F. Supp. 141, 143 (D. Vt. 1993)
(involving plaintiff who frequently had heated arguments with his supervisor, in-
cluding one incident where he "lost his temper with his supervisor and directed
abusive language at him").
85. See, e.g., Simpkins v. Specialty Envelope, Inc., 94 F.3d 645 (table), No. 95-
3370, 1996 WL 452858, at *1-2 (6th Cir. Aug. 9, 1996).
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and addressed by the Supreme Court in Oncale v. Sundowner Off-
shore Services, Inc." was the specter that the decision would create "a
general civility code for the American workplace."'  The Court was
reassuring that this "risk" could be met by "careful attention to the
requirements of the statute." The Court emphasized that "verbal or
physical harassment" is not prohibited by Title VII and that it had
"never held that workplace harassment, even harassment between
men and women, is automatically discrimination."89 Although con-
cern about vague prohibitions of undefined behavior in the work-
place is understandable, the vehemence with which the Court re-
jected a "code of civility" in the workplace and underscored the
immunity of generalized workplace harassment from gender dis-
crimination law only confirms that legal protection-if any-for
emotionally fragile workers today must come from the ADA, or it
will not be there at all.
B. The Relationship Between Abuse, Interpersonal Conflicts, and the
Definition of Disability
One of the fundamental canons of psychiatry and the medical
profession is that high levels of stress can cause, trigger, or exacer-
bate both physical illness and psychiatric disabilities. 90 These dis-
abilities and illnesses, however, can diminish or even vanish if the
stress is reduced.
Because courts, consciously or unconsciously, associate disability
with the model of blindness, deafness, and severe mobility impair-
ment, they construct disability as permanent, unchanging, and located
totally within the individual. Although some courts have been able
to understand that physical disability can manifest itself episodically 91
86. 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998) (holding that Title VII covers same-sex harassment).
87. Id. at 1002.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See LINAs A. BIELIAUSKAS, STRESS AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO HEALTH
AND ILLNESS 22-23, 63, 81-87 (1982); Muhammad Jamal, Relationship of Job
Stress and Type-A Behavior to Employees' Job Satisfaction, Organizational
Commitment, Psychosomatic Health Problems, and Turnover Motivation, 43
HuM. REL. 727, 735 (1990); see also Simpson v. Chater, 908 F. Supp. 817, 822 (D.
Or. 1995) (noting that plaintiff's treating physician confirmed that "stress of
working would exacerbate the progression of [plaintiff's multiple sclerosis]").
91. See Vande Zande v. State Dept. of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 544 (7th Cir.
1995) ("[A]n intermittent impairment that is a characteristic manifestation of an
admitted disability is, we believe, a part of the underlying disability, and hence a
condition that the employer must reasonably accommodate. Often the disabling
April 1998]
812 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:795
or as a result of a physical environmente or physical demands,93
courts do not have the same understanding of psychiatric disabilities,
which also manifest themselves episodically,' and often as a result of
environmental or psychological demands. Above all, courts cannot
conceptualize disability as interactional or arising in an interpersonal
context. Therefore, they cannot recognize many psychiatric disability
claims, sometimes declaring that psychiatric disability of certain ori-
gins-primarily psychiatric disability which the plaintiff traces to dif-
ficulties and conflicts with co-workers or supervisors-cannot exist as
a matter of law. 5
In Weiler v. Household Finance Corp.,96 the plaintiff asked to be
transferred after her supervisor, who had decided to conduct her an-
nual employment review in the cafeteria, "got loud, sarcastic and
abusive. He discussed her physical and mental disabilities in a loud
voice and was critical of the various therapies she was undergoing.
On numerous occasions during the evaluation, [he] allegedly lunged
forward in his chair and put his face close to plaintiff's and got
louder."' 7 This was apparently the culmination of a long campaign of
aspect of a disability is, precisely, an intermittent manifestation of the disability
rather than the underlying impairment.") (emphasis added).
92. See Fehr v. McLean Packaging Corp., 860 F. Supp. 198, 200 (E.D. Pa.
1994).
93. See Valle v. City of Chicago, 982 F. Supp. 560, 565 (N.D. Ill. 1997)
(finding that police officer candidate with rhabdomyolysis-a physical disability
which manifests itself under heavy physical exertion-stated a claim under the
ADA when denied requested accommodation of relaxed running requirement in
police training program).
94. See PRACriCE AND COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 37, at 93
("Chronic episodic conditions may constitute substantially limiting impairments
if they are substantially limiting when active or have a high likelihood of recur-
rence in substantially limiting forms.").
95. See Siemon v. American Tel. & Tel. Corp., 117 F.3d 1173, 1176 (10th Cir.
1997) (stating that a "mental impairment merely prevent[ing a plaintiff] from
working under a few supervisors within the organizational structure of one major
corporation ... is far too narrow to constitute a 'class of jobs"' under the ADA's
interpretive guidelines); Weiler v. Household Fin. Corp., No. 93 C 6454, 1995 WL
452977, at *5 (N.D. IM. July 27, 1995) (holding that conflict with employer not
recognized as a disability under the ADA), affd, 101 F.3d 519 (7th Cir. 1996);
Dewitt v. Carsten, 941 F. Supp. 1232, 1236 (finding that job related stress does
not qualify as a disability under the ADA); Hatfield v. Quantum Chem. Corp.,
920 F. Supp. 108, 110 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (holding that disability due to friction with
supervisor does not qualify as a disability under the ADA); Adams v. Alderson,
723 F. Supp. 1531, 1531 (D.D.C. 1989) (finding that employee's reaction to su-
pervisor was "transitory phenomenon" because it would disappear if supervisor
was removed).
96. No. 93 C 6454, 1994 WL 262175 (N.D. Ill. June 10, 1994).
97. Id. at *1.
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abuse by the plaintiff's supervisory' In a later decision granting the
defendant's motion for summary judgment, the court noted:
The ADA does not protect people from the general
stresses of the workplace. Everyone has encountered diffi-
cult situations in the working environment. Being unwilling
or even unable to work with a particular individual simply is
not the equivalent of being "'substantially limited"' in the
life activity of working .... The evidence shows that the
plaintiff had a personality conflict with [her supervisor], al-
beit one which caused her to suffer anxiety and depression
to an apparently significant degree. A disability is part of
someone and goes with her to her next job. A personality
conflict, on the other hand, is specific to an individual, in this
case, [plaintiffs supervisor] '9
The court in Weiler, like other courts in these cases, supported its
decision by micro-analyzing Weiler's situation as a personality con-
flict with her supervisor,'0' which by definition was so individualized
that Weiler could not meet the EEOC regulatory requirement that
her disability disqualify her from more than a single job."0 The court
did not frame her disability as an unusual fragility or vulnerability to
interpersonal conflict or public humiliation °2 which she would carry
with her to her next job and which, in fact, is replicated'in many other
psychiatric disability cases."
It is important to underscore that psychiatric disabilities are the
only disabilities where courts look to etiology rather than to manifes-
tations of the disability itself to determine whether the plaintiff is a
member of the protected class. Weiler was placed on disability leave
98. Id. at *1-2.
99. Weiler, 1995 WL 452977, at *5 (emphasis added).
100. See id. at *4-5.
101. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (1997). This section provides that with re-
spect to the major life activity of working:
[t]he term substantially limits means significantly restricted in the ability
to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various
classes as compared to the average person having comparable training,
skills and abilities. The inability to perform a single, particular job does
not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of work-
ng.
Id.
102 See Weiler, 1995 WL 452977, at *5.
103. See Mears v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 905 F. Supp. 1075, 1077 (S.D.
Ga. 1995) (noting that precipitating event of breakdown was being escorted
through the office by two security guards for drug test after she had dropped files
while suffering from a migraine), affd mem., 87 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir. 1996).
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and diagnosed with depression and anxiety after the incident with her
supervisor." 4 The court acknowledged that she suffered "anxiety and
depression to an apparently significant degree."'15 But it does not
matter if plaintiffs are institutionalized... or medicated with powerful
psychotropic drugs;'O' courts are unmoved even if all testifying ex-
perts and physicians agree on their diagnosis. If the disability arises
from interpersonal difficulties, it is not a disability under the ADA as
a matter of law. Plaintiffs who claim that their psychiatric disability is
related to a conflict with their supervisors simply do not win ADA
cases.1'3
Meanwhile, physical disabilities that manifest themselves in in-
terpersonal difficulties are protected, as are psychiatric disabilities
that arise from various other sources. For. instance, in Gilday v. Me-
costa County,"° the court held that a plaintiff who was fired because
he was rude and could not get along with co-workers and customers
stated a cause of action under the ADA because he was a diabetic.10
The plaintiff had put forth sufficient evidence to overcome summary
judgment by alleging that fluctuating blood sugar levels impaired his
ability to work amiably with co-workers and patients."' The court
also noted that Gilday became "frustrated and irritable" when his
blood sugar deviated from normal levels'12 and that "[s]tress [could]
also apparently cause his blood sugar to fluctuate wildly,".. 3 and
therefore remanded so the district court could consider whether
transfer to a less stressful and chaotic position would be a reasonable
accommodation."'
Likewise, the very few psychiatric disability cases that survive
motions to dismiss or for summary judgment are cases in which the
disability either clearly does not arise from the work environment at
104. See Weiler, 1995 WL 452977, at *1.
105. Id. at *5.
106. See Miller v. National Casualty Co., 61 F.3d 627, 629 (8th Cir. 1995)
(involving employer held not to have been informed of plaintiff's disability de-
spite call from plaintiff's sister saying that she "'was mentally falling apart and
the family was trying to get her into the hospital"'); Simpkins, 1996 WL 452858,
at *2; Adams, 723 F. Supp. at 1531 n.1.
107. See Simpkins, 1996 WL 452858, at *2.
108. See, e.g., id.; Mundo v. Sanus Health Plan, 966 F. Supp. 171, 173
(E.D.N.Y. 1997); Mears, 905 F. Supp. at 1075.
109. 124 F.3d 760 (6th Cir. 1997).
110. See id. at 765.
111. See id.
112. Id. at 761.
113. Id.
114. See id. at 766.
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all or arises from some physical and non-personal aspect of the em-
ployment. For example, courts have far less difficulty accepting psy-
chiatric disabilities such as claustrophobia,115 agoraphobia,"6 anxiety
disorder related to commuting, 17 stress related to working with nu-
clear energy,"8 and, occasionally, claims related to the side effects of
medication taken for mental disorders."9
The rejection of psychiatric disability is thus not so much a re-
pudiation of the theory that disabilities can be triggered by environ-
ment or context as a visceral rejection of the specific contention that
disabilities can be triggered by dealing with other people. The court
in Weiler makes clear its belief that Weiler, who worked for House-
hold Finance without difficulty for seven years, is simply "unwilling"
to work with her supervisor.12 While Gilday is excused from respon-
sibility for monitoring his blood sugar level, Weiler is ousted from the
legal system for failing to control her reaction to her supervisor, a
man who conducted her performance evaluation in the cafeteria and
115. See, e.g., Neveau v. Boise Cascade Corp., 902 F. Supp. 207 (D. Or. 1995)
(denying summary judgment because genuine issue existed whether claustro-
phobia caused by having to enter small enclosed "slusher" substantially limited
plaintiff's ability to perform her job).
116. See, e.g., Przybylak v. New York State Thruway Auth., No. 95-CV-
0707E(F), 1997 WL 662346 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 1997) (denying summary judg-
ment because genuine issue remained whether accommodation was reasonable);
Ofat v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n, No. 94-J-31, 1995 WL 310051 (Ohio Ct. App.
May 17, 1995) (affirming lower court's judgment against state for discrimination
against employee with panic disorder).
117. See, e.g., Poindexter v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 975 F.
Supp. 1387 (D. Kan. 1997) (stating that summary judgment was improper be-
cause genuine issue existed whether plaintiff's anxiety disorder qualified as a dis-
ability).
118. See, e.g., Pritchard v. Southern Co. Servs., 102 F.3d 1118 (11th Cir. 1996)
(reversing summary judgment against plaintiff on ADA and Rehabilitation Act
claims).
119. Compare Overton v. Reilly, 977 F.2d 1190, 1195 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding
that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issue of whether plaintiff
qualified for protection under the Rehabilitation Act due to depression medica-
tion which caused sleepiness at work), and Fehr v. McLean Packaging Co., 860 F.
Supp. 198, 200 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (denying summary judgment because genuine is-
sue remained whether shortness of breath caused by medication qualified as a
disability under the ADA), with Gordon v. E.L. Hamm & Assocs., 100 F.3d 907,
912 (11th Cir. 1996) (granting summary judgment for employer because plaintiff
failed to show that side effects resulting from chemotherapy treatments substan-
tially limited his ability to work).
120. See Weiler, 1995 WL 452977, at *4 ("[I]t is clear that the plaintiff could
work either in another position for this employer or for another employer-she
simply could not (or would not) work under [her current supervisor].").
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lunged and yelled at her.121 If Weiler's supervisor had sexually har-
assed her, the question would not be whether she could control her
reactions, but why the supervisor was not controlling his actions. Her
reaction to being yelled and lunged at is, however, her problem.
Of all judges to consider these ADA cases, only Judge Richard
Posner has been willing to entertain the notion that disabilities may
arise from interpersonal difficulties on the job. In Palmer v. Circuit
Court of Cook County22 Judge Posner begins by summarizing the
holding below, a typical district court decision finding that the plain-
tiff was not disabled because the disability she claimed arose from in-
terpersonal conflicts at work:
The district judge determined, as a matter of law, that
Palmer's depression and paranoia were not disabling be-
cause she testified in her deposition that she had never had
any problems at work before Clara Johnson became her su-
pervisor. This meant, the judge thought, that Palmer had
merely had "a personality conflict with her supervisor, Clara
Johnson, and her co-worker, Nicki Lazzaro-although one
which caused her to suffer anxiety and depression to an ap-
parently significant degree."'
Judge Posner at first appeared to support this conclusion:
The judge was certainly correct that a personality con-
flict with a supervisor or coworker does not establish a dis-
ability within the meaning of disability law ... even if it
produces anxiety and depression, as such conflicts often do.
Such a conflict is not disabling; at most it requires the
worker to get a new job."
But then, in seeming contradiction to the previous two sentences,
Judge Posner stated what no other judge to date has understood:
But if a personality conflict triggers a serious mental illness
121. See Weiler v. Household Fin.Corp., 101 F.3d 519,522 (7th Cir. 1996).
122. 117 F.3d 351, 352 (7th Cir. 1997).
123. Id. 352. Although the description that the personality conflict was "one
which caused her to suffer anxiety and depression to an apparently significant
degree" is identical to the phrase used in Weiler, the cases were decided by dif-
ferent judges. Id.; Weiler, 1995 WL 452977, at *5. The Weiler decision pre-
dated-and obviously influenced-the judge in Palmer.
124. Palmer, 117 F.3d at 352 (citation omitted). The ease with which this cir-
cuit court judge with lifetime tenure assumes that a clerical-level black woman
who has schizophrenia and major depression in Cook County can simply "go out
and get a new job" speaks volumes about the different worlds in which he and
the plaintiff live their lives.
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that is in turn disabling, the fact that the trigger was not it-
self a disabling illness is no defense. Schizophrenia and
other psychoses are frequently triggered by minor accidents
or other sources of normal stress .... Our only point is to
distinguish between the nondisabling trigger of a disabling
mental illness and the mental illness itself. On the record
compiled in the district court, it is not possible to negate the
inference that Palmer has in fact a disabling mental illness.12'
While people can differ over whether workplace abuse, espe-
cially at the levels seen in many of these cases, constitutes a source of
"normal stress"-th the accompanying assumption that normal
stress conditions are acceptable-Judge Posner's fundamental
proposition that a disability should not be disqualified merely be-
cause of its source in interpersonal conflict is sound. Rather, the key
in psychiatric disability cases-as in all other disability cases-is to
look at the manifestations of disability rather than the etiology of
disability.
C. The Relationship Between Stress and the Definition of Disability
. A number of ADA claims filed by employees with psychiatric
disabilities relate to their difficulty in tolerating stress. Plaintiffs who
allege that their psychiatric disabilities arise from stress, like plaintiffs
whose claims arise from interpersonal difficulties, are regarded by
courts as not being disabled as a matter of law."l In one case, a
plaintiff raised both job stress and interpersonal difficulties associ-
ated with her supervisor, a sheriff.' The court held that she could
not be disabled as a matter of law:
Indeed, the causal relationship between the job and her
claimed "disability" distinguishes plaintiff's stress from
other conditions that clearly constitute disabilities under the
ADA. After all, a visually impaired person will be visually
125. Id. It is, of course, not only schizophrenia which can be triggered in this
way, but major depression, anxiety disorders, and bipolar disorder as well. See
BIELIAUSKAS, supra note 90, at 87; PETER C. WHYBROw, A MOOD APART 172-
73, 182 (1997). However, the conditions Judge Posner described were only the
ones principally at issue in Palmer.
126. See, e.g., Mundo v. Sanus Health Plan, 966 F. Supp. 171, 173 (E.D.N.Y.
1997) ("[A]n inability to tolerate stressful situations is not an impairment for
purposes of the ADA."); Dewitt v. Carsten, 941 F. Supp. 1232, 1236 (N.D. Ga.
1996) (stating that stress triggered by only one job does not constitute a disability
under the ADA), affd mem., 122 F.3d 1079 (11th Cir. 1997).
127. See Dewitt, 941 F. Supp. at 1234.
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impaired no matter what job he holds; a quadriplegic will be
unable to walk whether or not he is employed. Plaintiff's
"disability," however, was triggered only when, out of the
universe of hundreds of jobs, she held a very specific job in
the jail that required a lot of interaction with inmates and
with the Sheriff. According to plaintiff, this disability would
not be triggered if plaintiff had a job that required less in-
teraction with these individuals.'2
Perhaps this plaintiff should not have won. Her inability to interact
with prisoners in jail may have rendered her unable to perform an es-
sential function of the job, and perhaps she could not be reasonably
accommodated. 29 But the court found that she had not and could not
demonstrate that she was disabled precisely because she alleged that
her disability was triggered by interpersonal interactions and because
she referred to it as extreme stress and anxiety.'3
The very essence of most psychiatric disabilities, however, is that
they can be triggered or exacerbated by environmental stimuli, prin-
cipally stress and stressful interactions with others.1 In this respect,
they are similar to many physical disabilities. 2
The very fact that psychiatric difficulties manifest themselves in
certain contexts and relationships but not in others might be inter-
preted as making them easier to accommodate. Instead, courts inter-
pret this dichotomy to mean that psychiatric disabilities do not exist
at all, at least for the purposes of Title I of the ADA. For example,
in Adams v. Alderson,33 the court noted that "Adams' present psy-
chiatrist ... describes his condition as a 'maladaptive reaction to a
psychosocial stressor,' viz., the antagonizing supervisor, which is,
however, a transitory phenomenon that can be expected to disappear
128 Id. at 1237 (footnote omitted).
129. The plaintiff had asked for a transfer to a position at the courthouse,
which apparently required less interaction with prisoners and the sheriff. See id.
at 1234-35. But see Sharp v. Abate, 887 F. Supp. 695, 699 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
(finding that summary judgment was precluded because dealing with inmates
may not be an essential function of a corrections officer in New York).
130. See Dewitt, 941 F. Supp. at 1234.
131. See WHYBROW, supra note 124, at 169-95.
132 See Dwight Evans et al., Severe Life Stress as a Predictor of Early Disease
Progression in HIV Infection, 154 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 630 (May 1997) (finding
that for every single severe stressor per six-month study interval, the risk of early
disease progression doubled while, for subjects in the study for at least two years,
higher severe life stress increased the odds of developing HIV disease progres-
sion nearly four-fold).
133. 723 F. Supp. 1531 (D.D.C. 1989) (involving Rehabilitation Act).
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when the 'psychosocial stressor' is removed."134 This observation ap-
pears to indicate that Adams was capable of meeting the essential
functions of the job with a transfer to a different supervisor. The
next step would then have been to inquire whether such a transfer
was a reasonable accommodation under the circumstances. The
court, however, used the psychiatrist's testimony to find that Adams
was not disabled at all: "[The condition] is, therefore, hardly an
'impairment' which 'substantially limits one or more ... major life
activities.',
135
Most courts faced with claims of psychiatric disability resulting
from stress simply hold as a matter of law that stress is not a disability
under the ADA."6 As with disabilities arising from interpersonal
conflicts with supervisors and workplace abuse, this conclusion
misses the point. The question is not whether stress is a disability but
whether the stress causes or is a symptom of a disability covered un-
der the ADA.'
As in the case of interpersonal difficulties, courts have no prob-
lem understanding that job stress may cause physical disability.3 But
in a psychiatric disability case involving considerably greater manifes-
tations of disability than reflected in the physical disability cases,
139
the court found that the plaintiff did not meet the definition of dis-
134. Id. at 1531.
135. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B)) (defining 'disability' for the purposes
of the Rehabilitation Act).
136. See, e.g., Mundo, 966 F. Supp. 171; Dewitt, 941 F. Supp. 1232.
137. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, for example, has writ-
ten that "'stress' . . may or may not be considered [an] impairment[], depending
on whether... [it] result[s] from a documented physiological or mental disor-
der." EEOC, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL ON THE EMPLOYMENT
PROVISIONS (TITLE I) OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILmIES AcTr, § 2.1(a)(i),
at H1-3 (1992). At least one court has followed this interpretation. See Paleolo-
gos v. Rehab Consultants, Inc., No.Civ.1:96-CV-2193-JEC, 1998 WL 21667, at *2-
3 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 16, 1998).
138. See Patterson v. City of Seattle, 97 F.3d 1460 (table), No. 95-35487, 1996
WL 528267, at *1-2 (9th Cir. Sept. 17, 1996) (indicating that job-related stress
which exacerbated plaintiff's Crohn Disease might require reasonable accommo-
dation but finding that requested accommodation not necessary for plaintiff to
perform essential functions of job); Gonsalves v. J.F. Fredericks Tool Co., 964 F.
Supp. 616, 621 (D. Conn. 1997) (acknowledging that hypertension and diabetes
exacerbated by unreasonable work expectations may qualify as a disability under
the ADA).
139. Margeson v. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co., No. CIV.A. 91-11475-Z, 1993
WL 343676, at *5 (D. Mass. Aug. 24, 1993) (stating that stress condition resulted
in ongoing treatment, numerous trips to the emergency room, canceled family
vacations, and absence from work).
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ability.'
4
Interestingly, although the definition of disability for purposes of
receiving disability benefits is considerably more stringent than the
definition of disability for purposes of the ADA' 41-and requires an
inability to work in almost any job-many plaintiffs who lose psychi-
atric disability claims on the grounds that they are not disabled nev-
ertheless receive disability benefits for the very disability at issue in
the discrimination case.'42 Not only do employers not fight the dis-
ability benefits claim as vigorously as the ADA claim, they often en-
courage and facilitate the disability benefits claim or even make it
mandatory. 43
III. PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITY AND THE REQUIREMENT THAT
EMPLOYEES BE "QUALIFIED INDIVIDUALS"
In addition to requiring that plaintiffs demonstrate that they are
disabled in order to receive the protection of the ADA, courts re-
quire plaintiffs to establish that they are "qualified individual[s] with
a disability."'" To be a qualified individual, the plaintiff must be a
person who can, "with or without reasonable accommodation,
perform the essential functions of the employment position."'45
A. Interpersonal Conflicts and Being a "Qualified Individual"
Occasionally, a court will concede that the plaintiff is disabled
and will examine the plaintiffs interpersonal difficulties in the con-
text of being otherwise qualified for the job.'
140. See id.
141. To qualify for ADA protection, an employee "must show that she is a
'qualified individual with a disability' who can perform the essential functions of
her position despite her disability, or, can perform the essential functions of her
job with a reasonable accommodation." Lewis v. Zilog, Inc., 908 F. Supp. 931,
944 (N.D. Ga. 1995). On the other hand, to qualify to receive disability benefits,
an employee must "be totally disabled to perform any job." Id. at 945.
142. See, e.g., Hatfield v. Quantum Chem. Corp., 920 F. Supp. 108, 111 (S.D.
Tex. 1996); Lewis, 908 F. Supp. at 945.
143. See, e.g., Misek-Falkoff v. International Bus. Mach. Corp., 854 F. Supp.
215,220 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), affd mem., 60 F.3d 811 (2d Cir. 1995).
144. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994).
145. Id. § 12111(8).
146. These concessions are usually made in the face of either defendant stipu-
lations to the plaintiffs disability or overwhelming evidence of multiple hospi-
talizations and long histories of treatment. See, e.g., McCrory v. Kraft Food In-
gredients, 98 F.3d 1342 (table), No. 94-6505, 1996 WL 571146 (6th Cir. Oct. 3,
1996); Misek-Falkoff, 854 F. Supp. at 218-19; Boldini v. Postmaster Gen., 928 F.
Supp. 125 (D.N.H. 1995); Lewis, 908 F. Supp. at 944.
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In determining whether a plaintiff is otherwise qualified for a
job, courts undertake the very opposite mode of analysis to the one
employed in deciding whether a plaintiff has a disability. When
courts consider whether a plaintiff is disabled, they conduct minute
micro-analyses, examining the plaintiff's situation with great specific-
ity. This typically leads to the determination that the inability to get
along with one specific supervisor cannot constitute a disability be-
cause it leaves the plaintiff presumptively capable of performing
every other job in which he or she does not report to the particular
objectionable supervisor."
When courts decide whether a plaintiff is "otherwise qualified,"
however, the inquiry is raised to a grand level of abstraction, with
courts finding that "[iut is certainly 'a job-related requirement' that
an employee, handicapped or not, be able to get along with co-
workers and supervisors."'" When deciding whether the plaintiff is
disabled, courts assume that the plaintiff can get along with anyone
but the supervisor in question.1 49 When deciding whether the plaintiff
is a "qualified individual with a disability," the plaintiff's inability to
get along with one or a few people is generalized into an inability to
get along with anyone, thus rendering him or her unqualified for this
or any other job."0
Ironically, when courts analyze whether a plaintiff is disabled,
the ability to get along with others is dismissed as not constituting a
major life activity. 5' But when the question is whether a plaintiff is
otherwise qualified to work, the ability to get along with others is
deemed an essential function of the job. Because social interactions
are uniquely relevant in cases of psychiatric disability, this disparity
sweeps only people with psychiatric disabilities into its net.
Indeed, courts have enumerated a growing list of social skills as
147. See Weiler v. Household Fin. Corp., No. 93 C 6454, 1995 WL 452977, at
*4 (N.D. Ill. July 27, 1995).
148. Misek-Falkoff, 854 F. Supp. at 227.
149. See, e.g., Hatfield v. Quantum Chem. Corp., 920 F. Supp. 108, 110 (S.D.
Tex. 1996).
150. See, e.g., Pesterfield v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 941 F.2d 437, 442 (6th Cir.
1991); Misek-Falkoff, 854 F. Supp. at 227; Schmidt v. Bell, No. CIV. A. 82-1758,
1983 WL 631, at *14 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 9, 1983).
151. See, e.g., Guilford of Maine, Inc. v. Soileau, 105 F.3d 12, 14-15 (1st Cir.
1997). This is true despite the fact that the EEOC has made it clear that interact-
ing with others is, in fact, a major life activity. See PRACrICE AND COMPLIANCE
MANUAL, supra note 37, at 91.
152. See, e.g., Grenier v. Cyanamid Plastics, Inc., 70 F.3d 667, 675 (1st Cir.
1995).
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"essential" to employment. 3 Such skills include the ability to get
along with supervisors and co-workers;-4 to accept and follow in-
structions;155 to refrain from contentious arguments and insubordinate
conduct with supervisors, co-employees, or customers;156 to not cause
or contribute to undue interruptions and hostility in the workplace;'"
and even to serve as a role model for other staff.' One court con-
cluded that "plaintiff's behavior violated essential functions of her
working environment" because she "conducted herself and her job as
though she knew more about the particular business affairs than did
her supervisors."'5 9
In few of these cases do courts actually look at the specific func-
tions of the particular job. For example, the ability to "refrain from
contentious arguments and insubordinate conduct with supervisors,
co-employees or customers" was regarded as an essential function of
the job of a mail carrier who delivered mail by herself in a ruralarea. 160
In cases involving interpersonal difficulties, courts have deemed
getting along with bosses or co-workers an essential function of the
job and the responsibility of the disabled employee.61 Cultivation of
interpersonal relationships is rarely conceptualized as a shared re-
153. The district court judge in Palmer v. Circuit Court is one of the few ex-
ceptions. In dicta, he noted that "[t]he non-essential functions of plaintiff's job
included working with Clara Johnson and Nicki Lazzaro." Palmer v. Circuit
Court, 905 F. Supp. 499,509 (N.D. IM. 1995), aff'd, 117 F.3d 351 (7th Cir. 1997).
154. See Pesterfield, 941 F.2d at 442; Misek-Falkoff, 854 F. Supp. at 227.
155. See Boldini, 928 F. Supp. at 131.
156. See id. (finding that plaintiff failed to follow procedures and failed to ac-
cept authority).
157. See Misek-Falkoff, 854 F. Supp. at 227. Under some circumstances this
could be seen as excluding union organizers from the realm of qualified employ-
ebs.
158. See EEOC v. Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d 135, 138 (1st Cir. 1997) ("The essen-
tial functions of that position included: supervising the day-to-day implementa-
tion of individual clinical, educational, and vocational programs and data collec-
tion for all programs; serving as a role model for staff in all areas of client
programming, client services, and professional practice .... ."). The court con-
cluded plaintiff did not meet her burden of showing she was able to meet the es-
sential function of overseeing and administering medication. See id. at 144.
159. Boldini, 928 F. Supp. at 131. In this case, at the time of the events re-
ferred to by the court, Boldini had worked at the post office for almost eight
years, and her supervisor had been appointed in the previous year. See id. at 128.
160. See id. at 131. Although there were allegations that she engaged in con-
tentious arguments with customers and co-workers, these allegations arose for
the first time seven years after she began working, immediately upon the ap-
pointment of a new supervisor. See id. at 128.
161. See id. at 131; Misek-Falkoff, 854 F. Supp. at 227.
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sponsibility" Unfortunately, employers are not held to the slightest
burden of training employees or supervisors on working with people
with psychiatric disabilities.' Like many analogous physical accom-
modations for people with disabilities,'6 such training would probably
benefit non-disabled employees as well.
Moreover, many courts do not appear to take very seriously
plaintiffs' contentions that their difficulties in interpersonal relations
stemmed from the actions of co-employees or supervisors. In one
troubling case a court declared that whether the plaintiff was correct
when she stated she had not started the difficulties was irrelevant.
The court noted that "where there are external indications of serious
difficulties in the interaction between an employee and other em-
ployees and staff of the employer, as is the case here, the reality of
perceptions of the supervisors, regardless of the correctness of those
perceptions, presents a problem for the employer.'
165
The court is correct that supervisors' perceptions may present a
problem for the employer, but the employer's problem may be one
with the supervisors rather than with the plaintiff. If the supervisors'
perceptions were that cancer was contagious or that AIDS could be
contracted from doorknobs, it is unlikely that a court would believe
that the reality of the supervisors' perceptions, regardless of their
correctness, was what counted in terminating an employee with can-
cer or AIDS.
In School Board of Nassau County v. Arline,'66 the Supreme
Court emphasized that disabilities could be constructed as much by
the attitudes, interactions with, and reactions of others as by any in-
herent physical or mental limitations presented by the impairments
themselves.67 In interpreting the predecessor statute to the ADA,' 68
162 See Wernick v. Federal Reserve Bank, 91 F.3d 379, 384 (2d Cir. 1996)
("one of the essential functions of [her] job was to work under her assigned su-
pervisor") (emphasis added).
163. Although a number of employers have undertaken such efforts voluntar-
ily, the EEOC has reserved judgment on whether such training could be required
as a reasonable accommodation for an individual with a disability. See OFFICE
OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, UNITED STATES CONGRESS, PSYCHIATRIC
DISABILITIES, EMPLOYMENT, AND THE AMERICANS wITH DISABILITIES Act 80
n.7 (1994).
164. For example, curb cuts and ramps benefit people on bicycles, people with
strollers, people on skates, as well as people with mobility or visual impairments.
165. Misek-Falkoff, 854 F. Supp. at 228 (emphasis added).
166. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
167. See id. at 282-83 ("That history [of § 504] demonstrates that Congress was
as concerned about the effect of an impairment on others as it was about its ef-
fect on the individual .... Such an impairment might not diminish a person's
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the Court disagreed with the assumption of the Weiler court that "a
disability is part of someone that goes with her to her next job."169
Rather, the Court reasoned that disability can be created by one's
environment.17 ° In fact, Congress made clear in a variety of ways, in-
cluding the legislative history, comments from the floor of both the
House and Senate, and through reprinting of testimony at hearings,
that social and physical barriers constituted disability as much or
more than the individual's impairment.'
B. Stress and Being a "Qualified Individual"
In cases involving the determination of whether an employee
who has difficulty withstanding stress is a qualified individual, courts
also employ reasoning that contradicts their assumptions when mak-
ing decisions about whether people who have difficulty dealing with
stress are disabled.
Courts conclude in one of two ways that people whose alleged
psychiatric disabilities were caused by stress are not disabled under
the ADA. Either the court assumes that the stress was associated
with the specific job and that the plaintiff could do any job except the
one at issue,"7 or the court concludes that stress itself simply does not
qualify as a disability.1 73 In deciding whether a plaintiff who suffers
from stress in the workplace is qualified for employment, courts
physical or mental capabilities, but could nevertheless substantially limit that
person's ability to work as a result of the negative reactions of others to the im-
pairment.")
168. See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 793-94 (1994). Congress
intended interpretation of the Rehabilitation Act to conform to interpretation of
the ADA, and referred specifically and approvingly to the Supreme Court's in-
terpretation of the definition of disability in Arline at several points in the legis-
lative history of the ADA. See S. REP. No. 101-116, at 23-24, 27 (1989); H.R.
REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 53 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 335 ;
H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 30 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445,
453.
169. Weiler, 1995 WL 452977, at *5.
170. See Arline, 480 U.S. at 283 n.10 ("[T]he effects of one's impairment on
others is as relevant to a determination of whether one is handicapped as is the
physical effect of one's handicap on oneself.").
171. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 35, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
317 (quoting Senator Weicker's testimony that "[p]eople with disabilities have
been saying for years that their major obstacles are not inherent in their disabili-
ties, but arise from barriers that have been imposed externally and unnecessar-
ily"); 135 CONG. REc. 10,711 (1989) ("But ask any person with a disability: Most
often it is not his or her own disability that is limiting; it is the obstacles placed in
the way by an independent society.") (statement of Senator Harkin).
172. See, e.g., Dewitt v. Carsten, 941 F. Supp. 1232, 1235-36 (N.D. Ga. 1996).
173. See, e.g., id.
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simply rely on the generalization that all employees must be able to
endure stress in general; otherwise, they are not qualified for em-
ployment." This contradicts Congress's instructions on interpreting
the ADA on a case-by-case basis.175
Distinctions regarding the source of stress in the workplace are
vital to understanding the requirements of Title I in the context of
individuals with psychiatric disabilities. Stress in the workplace is
caused by a variety of factors. The only court to parse the causes of
stress noted:
Sometimes... the job is inherently stressful. (Dealing with
inmates would be a good candidate for an inherently stress-
ful job). Sometimes, the job is stressful because one's boss
is unpleasant or demanding or yells at his employees or be-
cause the employee just does not hit it off with her boss or
co-workers. Other times, the employee simply may be ill-
suited in temperament or skill for the job and this poor fit
will necessarily create stress as the employee endeavors to
perform a job whose demands are simply too much for
her.
176
These different sources of stress have markedly different meanings
under the ADA, and may lead to markedly different outcomes.
1. "The job is inherently stressful"
The ADA requires that a plaintiff be able to perform the essen-
tial functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodation.'
If the stress causing or exacerbating an employee's psychiatric dis-
ability is fundamentally intertwined with the essential functions of
the job, and cannot be reasonably accommodated, an employer can-
not be required to alter the essential functions of the job.' 8
Some courts have characterized either a particular job or all
employment as "inherently stressful."'79 However, the interaction of
174. See, e.g., id. at 1237.
175. See, e.g., Ennis v. National Ass'n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55,
59-60 (4th Cir. 1995) (construing 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)).
176. Dewitt, 941 F. Supp. at 1235.
177. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5).
178. See, e.g., Boldini v. Postmaster Gen., 928 F. Supp. 125, 131 (D.N.H. 1995).
The employer may have to transfer the employee to an available, open position.
See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2)(ii) (1997).
179. Schmidt v. Bell, No. CIV. A. 82-1758, 1983 WL 631, at *14 (E.D. Pa. Sept.
9, 1983) (holding that position of student loan collector was inherently stressful
under the Rehabilitation Act).
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psychiatric disability and stress is far more complicated and contex-
tual than courts have considered. For example, as one woman with a
psychiatric diagnosis wrote:
For a decade, I functioned in the high-stress world of urban
policing. Fortunately, when I got really down, there were an
abundance of mental health professionals to whom I could
turn for discussion and medication. Unfortunately, aberrant
behavior is not easily detected among urban police profes-
sionals. Because of their independence in a patrol car and
little or no supervision while on duty, they have a cult-like
environment that almost encourages and rewards aggression
and other violent attitudes toward street criminals.
For this reason, my dark, irascible nature could sneak
up on me and envelop me before anyone around me might
notice. At one point I developed a reputation on the street
of being the "lady cop who wouldn't take no lip off no-
body." I actually considered it a compliment at the time.' sW
This woman functioned well in the stressful life of a police officer on
the street but poorly in a job that was apparently less stressful. The
second job required her to be "cooped up in a little room with a
bunch of chattering women. [She] thought [she] would strangle more
than one of them."8 ' In another case, "an individual who was expert
in cold stress and survival found crossing the polar ice cap consid-
erably less demanding than giving an important lecture at the Edin-
burgh Medical School.""'
Case studies show there is no single set of circumstances that
employees with psychiatric disabilities identify as stressful. For ex-
ample, although case law suggests that, for many people, working at
home is considered less stressful,"" in a study of workers with psychi-
atric disabilities, one woman stated she didn't like to work at home
because "'[she] can go days without saying a word to anybody and
that tends to make things more stressful."'' "" One person interviewed
180. Tammy D. Clevenger, Where Do I Fit In?, 48 PsycH. SERvS. 1007, 1007
(Aug. 1997).
181. Id.
182. WHYBROW, supra note 124, at 170.
183. See, e.g., Paleologos v. Rehab Consultants, Inc, No.Civ.1:96-CV-2193-
JEC, 1998 WL 21667, at *6 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 16, 1998); Hernandez v. City of Hart-
ford, 959 F. Supp. 125, 128 (D. Conn. 1997).
184. LAURA MANCUSO, CALIFORNIA DEPT. OF MENTAL HEALTH, CASE
STUDIES ON REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS FOR WORKERS WITH PSY-
CHIATRIC DISABILrTIES 35 (1993).
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for the study recalled a period in which he and his colleagues worked
eighty hours each week. This employee stated: "'It was constant in-
tense hours, not just being there for 80 hours .... And I didn't get
any more symptomatic because I was purposeful, and I was getting
somewhere, had a sense of accomplishment. I got much more symp-
tomatic when I had a lot of time on my hands ....
Thus, whether a job is inherently stressful requires a far more
individualized determination than courts have previously conducted.
Similarly, the relationship between stress and psychiatric disability is
more complex. But simply trying to parse out whether the stress
complained of is inherent to the essential functions of the job would
be a useful first step for most courts.
2. "The job is stressful because the boss is unpleasant or demanding
or yells at the employees"
It is hard to imagine that it is essential to the functions of any job
for a boss to yell at his or her employees or to behave in the wide va-
riety of abusive ways chronicled in these cases. It is equally difficult
to imagine an employer resorting to the defense that eliminating
abusive behavior would be too expensive or constitute a fundamental
alteration in the nature of the job.
3. "The job is stressful because the employee just does not hit it off
with his or her boss or co-workers"
Stress caused by failing to "hit it off" with one's boss or co-
workers covers a multitude of situations, some of which, such as
workplace harassment or hostile environment, are covered by the
ADA.'1
In fact, stress caused by failing to "hit it off" with one's boss or
co-workers may be the result of any number of factors. An examina-
tion of cases brought under the ADA suggests that race and gender
discrimination may constitute a considerable cause of the stress gen-
185. Id.
186. Every court that has decided the issue has held that the ADA covers
hostile environment claims. See, e.g., Rio v. Runyon, 972 F. Supp. 1446, 1459
(S.D. Fla. 1997); Rodriguez v. Loctite Puerto Rico, Inc., 967 F. Supp. 653, 663-64
(D.P.R. 1997); McClain v. Southwest Steel Co., 940 F. Supp. 295, 301-02 (N.D.
Okla. 1996); Henry v. Guest Servs., Inc., 902 F. Supp. 245, 250 (D.D.C. 1995),
affd mem., 98 F.3d 646 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Haysman v. Food Lion, Inc., 893 F.
Supp. 1092, 1106-07 (S.D. Ga. 1995). However, the Fifth Circuit has explicitly
stated that the question remains open. See McConathy v. Dr. Pepper/Seven Up
Corp., 131 F.3d 558,563 (5th Cir. 1998).
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erated in a situation where the employee doesn't hit it off with the
boss or co-workers. It is no coincidence that employees raise a sub-
stantial number of psychiatric disability claims under the ADA or the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973' in conjunction with claims of gender dis-
crimination,"' sexual harassment,89 race discrimination," ° or racially
hostile work environments. 9'
A number of ADA claims, both psychiatric and physical, involve
the interaction between race or gender discrimination and disability.
Race or gender discrimination is alleged to cause or aggravate physi-
cal'9 or psychiatric93 problems.
The interaction of race and gender discrimination, abusive work
environments, and severe emotional debilitation has been evident in
case law and research literature for more than twenty-five years. 4
Before the ADA, many claims of race and sex discrimination in-
cluded descriptions of psychiatric disability suffered by the plaintiff.195
Such claims, especially those related to a hostile environment, also
included allegations that the employer's actions caused the employee
"severe and substantial emotional distress."' 96 Despite evidence of
187. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797 (1994).
188. See Hunt-Golliday v. Metropolitan Water Reclamation Dist., 104 F.3d
1004, 1006 (7th Cir. 1997); Hazeldine v. Beverage Media, Ltd., 954 F. Supp. 697,
698-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Kotlowski v. Eastman Kodak Co., 922 F. Supp. 790, 794-
95 (W.D.N.Y. 1996); Lewis v. Zilog, Inc., 908 F. Supp. 931, 936 (N.D. Ga. 1995).
189. See Kaufman v. Checkers Drive-In Restaurants, Inc., 122 F.3d 892, 893
(11th Cir. 1997); Hunt-Golliday, 104 F.3d at 1006; Bryant v. Better Bus. Bureau,
923 F. Supp. 720,727 (D. Md. 1996).
190. See Hunt-Golliday, 104 F.3d at 1006; Guice-Mills v. Derwinski, 967 F.2d
794, 796 (2d Cir. 1992); Brown v. Northern Trust Bank, No. 95 C 7559, 1997 WL
543098, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 2, 1997).
191. See Palmer v. Circuit Court, 117 F.3d 351, 351-52 (7th Cir. 1997); Contre-
ras v. Suncast Corp., No. 96 C 3439, 1997 WL 598120, at *1-2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 19,
1997); Prince v. Suffolk County Dept. of Health Servs., Nos. 89 Civ. 7243 (LAP),
89 Civ. 8085 (LAP), 1996 WL 393528, at *1-3 (S.D.N.Y. July 12, 1996); Rivera v.
Domino's Pizza, Inc., No. CIV. A. 95-1378, 1996 WL 53802, at *1-2 (E.D. Pa.
Feb. 9, 1996).
192. Williams v. Dairy Fresh Ice Cream Inc., No. CIV. A. 2:95-1041-RV, 1997
WL 834163, at *1 (S.D. Ala. Oct. 10, 1997) (involving aggravation of plaintiffs
epilepsy due to poor treatment by supervisor, including the use of racial epi-
thets).
193. Webb v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 57 F.3d 1067 (table), No. 94-1784, 1995
WL 352485, at *5 (4th Cir. June 13, 1995).
194. See, e.g., Austin, supra note 38, at 1-5, 8-17, 51-55; Ezra H. Griffith &
Elvin J. Griffith, Racism, Psychological Injury, and Compensatory Damages, 37
HosP. & CoMMuNrrY PsYcmIATRY 71, 71 (Jan. 1986).
195. See Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 944-46 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Xieng v.
Peoples Nat'l Bank, 821 P.2d 520,523 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991).
196. Green v. American Broad. Co., 647 F. Supp. 1359, 1361 (D.D.C. 1986).
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the interaction between race and gender discrimination claims and
claims of severe emotional distress in the workplace, the courts have
not generally appreciated the intersection of these claims.
In fact, if employees sue for disability discrimination in addition
to race, gender, or age discrimination, the court may accuse the
plaintiff's attorney of adopting a "kitchen sink" approach to the liti-
gation."9 Thus, each claim is delegitimized simply because of the
presence of others. More often, courts consider the claims in a con-
ceptual vacuum, separating various kinds of discrimination and ignor-
ing the interrelationship among them.
The relationship between discrimination on the basis of psychi-
atric disability and race or gender discrimination may be concurrent.
Studies for over twenty years have confirmed "significant correla-
tions between negative attitudes toward different racial groups and
the mentally ill.' 98 Recent studies conclude:
the social and demographic characteristics which place some
people at severe disadvantage in the labor market [e.g., age,
race, and gender] operate even more strongly among those
with mental conditions, suggesting that the presence of a
mental condition makes a bad employment situation much
worse than would be indicated by either the mental condi-
tion or the social or demographic characteristics alone.'
Case law suggests that members of racial minority groups who have
disabilities work in environments where they must contend with
hostility towards both their racial status and their disability.'
197. See Hunt-Golliday, 104 F.3d at 1006 ("In this lawsuit, [plaintiff] tossed
everything in the kitchen, including the sink, at her former employer....").
198. Clifford R. Schneider & Wayne Anderson, Attitudes Toward the Stigma-
tized: Some Insights from Recent Research, REHABILITATION COUNSELING
BULL., June 1980, at 299, 301 (citing Robert Harth, Attitudes Towards Minority
Groups as a Construct in Assessing Attitudes Towards the Mentally Retarded, 6
EDUC. & TRAINING OF THE MENTALLY RETARDED 142 (1971); Charles L. Mul-
ford, Ethnocentrism and Attitudes Toward the Mentally Ill, 9 Soc. Q. 107 (1968)).
199. Edward H. Yelin & Miriam G. Cisternas, Employment Patterns Among
People With and Without Mental Conditions, in MENTAL DISORDER, WORK
DISABILITY AND THE LAW 25, 27 (Richard J. Bonnie & John Monahan eds.,
1997).
200. See Rivera, 1996 WL 53802, at *5. In Rivera, co-workers of a Puerto Ri-
can plaintiff with a speech impediment called him, among other things,
"retarded," "hired from . . . a facility for mentally handicapped people,"
"Mexican tamale," "a dumb Puerto Rican," "a dumb Mexican," "shit for brains,"
and said Puerto Ricans were not worth a damn. Id. at *1. When the plaintiff
complained to the regional manager he was told "'[t]hat's the way they joke
around"' and that he "'should not take it so seriously."' Id. at *2; see also Rivera
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Other cases suggest a cause and effect situation. In these situa-
tions, race discrimination or gender harassment may lead to massive
stress for the employee who, in turn, will seek professional assistance
and receive a diagnosis arguably requiring an accommodation."1
For example, in one case, an African-American research. analyst
for Suffolk County alleged that when he tried to use his research re-
garding the statistically significant number of low-birth-weight babies
born to African-American women in Suffolk County as the basis for
his Ph.D. thesis, he was transferred and demoted because his supervi-
sor was concerned that these facts would become public." His com-
plaint alleged that this demotion caused his psychological disability
which in turn resulted in his discriminatory termination.Y0 3 Ulti-
mately, he applied for and received disability benefits.2 The defen-
dant argued that it terminated the plaintiff because he could not do
his job and that his receipt of disability benefits estopped him from
arguing that he was a "qualified individual."" The court rejected this
argument, finding that the plaintiff alleged that "'the transfer and the
surrounding facts of the transfer' and 'the intense level of harass-
ment' by [the defendant] caused his mental disability."2  The court
continued: "[Defendant], therefore, may not profit from its wrongdo-
ing by relying on the very disability which its discriminatory conduct
created (assuming [plaintiff's] allegations are true) to terminate
v. Heyman, 982 F. Supp. 932, 933-34 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (HIV-positive employee
who complained of racial and religious slurs in addition to harassment based on
his disability); Chua v. St. Paul Fed. Bank for Says., No. 95 C 2463, 1996 WL
34458, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 26, 1996) (Asian-American was subjected to racially
derogatory names, and was imitated and mocked because of a limp).
201. See Webb, 1995 WL 352485, at *5; Prince, 1996 WL 393528, at *2-3, 5
(involving race discrimination by employer that led to mental disability); see also
BEYOND BEDLAM 167 (Jeanine Grobe ed., 1995) ("Despite the popular belief
that 'madness' is biological in origin, the survivors in this section [of the book]
have a different story. From our experiences, 'madness' has to do with home-
lessness, poverty, sexism, racism, ableism, mentalism, ageism, homophobia, eth-
nocentrism, and child abuse, to name a few."). In one case, the employer's re-
sponse to an employee's complaint of harassment based on gender and national
origin was to write a memorandum to the company's human resources depart-
ment stating that she was paranoid and to require her to undergo counseling as a
condition of her job. See Kohn, 1998 WL 67540, at *1.
202 See Prince, 1996 WL 393528, at *2. Ironically, far more people are privy
to this research-at least as allegations-because of this litigation than would
have been the case if Mr. Prince had simply been permitted to write his Ph.D.
thesis.
203. See id at *2-3.
204. See id at *5.
205. See icL
206. Id. at *5 n.8.
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[plaintiff's] employment. '' w
This court did what courts rarely do. It understood the interre-
lationship of the race and disability discrimination charges. In cases
involving work environments where hostility is expressed based on
both race and disability, however, courts rarely aggregate both forms
of harassment in considering the hostile environment claims.2 In
fact, contrary to the language of the ADA and its regulations, a few
courts have even held that people with disabilities caused by work-
place harassment and sex discrimination are somehow not covered by
the ADA.0 More often, courts simply disjoin race or sex discrimi-
nation and disability discrimination claims, treating each in an im-
maculate evidentiary vacuum.210
To be fair, the law is structured to make it very difficult for
courts to avoid this response.211 Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act, which limits recovery for discrimination to situations where the
worker's handicap is the "sole" reason for discrimination, provides
the classic example.212 Thus, as Congress noted when it eliminated
this requirement from the ADA,21 ' an individual discriminated
against on the grounds of both race and disability could not recover
under the law prohibiting disability discrimination until the early
1990S.214
However, other structures are still in place which present more
conceptually challenging obstacles. For example, the interrelation-
ship between disability discrimination law and employee disability
benefits law has presented difficulties in a number of cases.
If an employer, by racist acts or gender discrimination, causes an
employee's psychiatric disability, many courts are still struggling with
whether the case should be framed as a civil rights case or a medical
207. IL
208. See Rivera, 1996 WL 53802, at *4 n.3.
209. See Williams, 1997 WL 834163, at *1 (holding that employee's claim that
employer's racial discrimination and harassment aggravated his epilepsy did not
state a claim under the ADA); see also Krocka v. Bransfield, 969 F. Supp. 1073,
1083 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (denying employee's summary judgment motion on grounds
that he was not disabled under the ADA); Mears v. Gulfstream Aerospace
Corp., 905 F. Supp. 1075, 1082 (S.D. Ga. 1995) ("[I]f Gulfstream's conduct did
cause Plaintiffs disability, her remedy is under Georgia's worker compensation
laws, not the ADA."), affd mem., 87 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir. 1996).
210. See Leisen v. City of Shelbyville, 968 F. Supp. 409 (S.D. Ind. 1997).
211. See id. at 417-22.
212. See 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994).
213. See S. REP. No. 101-116, at 44-45 (1989).
214. See id.
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problem appropriately dealt with under the rubric of worker's com-
pensation or disability benefits.1 5
The difficulty of formulating an appropriate approach is caused
in part by conceptual distinctions between race and gender discrimi-
nation on the one hand and disability discrimination on the other.
Disability has only recently evolved from a totally medical concept to
one with political, social, and civil rights ramifications.2"6 Thus, dis-
ability discrimination law coexists with disability benefits law, ranging
from worker's compensation to the Employment Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA),217 which may help shape outcomes in ADA
cases, even when not explicitly addressed.2"8
For example, the maintenance of abusive and stressful work-
places and the consequent exclusion of more psychiatrically fragile
workers has arguably been facilitated by the existence of disability
benefits. Granting disability benefits to workers who are particularly
vulnerable to workplace abuse reinforces the notion that the problem
lies with the worker and not the working environment. Thus, the ex-
istence of these disability benefit programs provides a way for em-
ployers and society to continue to characterize the abusive workplace
as "normal" and its casualties as "abnormal" in a way that has not
been possible with sexual harassment, sex discrimination, and hostile
racial environments.
The Ninth Circuit's predicament in Nichols v. Frank19 vividly
reflects the dilemmas created by this approach. Nichols, a deaf-
mute, was forced by her supervisor-the only supervisor who knew
215. See Mears, 905 F. Supp. at 1082; Webb, 1995 WL 352485, at *6 n.6. This
issue is similar to the tort/civil rights/worker's compensation trilemma raised by
sexual harassment suits. See, e.g., Jean C. Love, Actions for Non-Physical Harm:
The Relationship Between the Tort System and No-Fault Compensation (With an
Emphasis on Workers' Compensation), 73 CAL. L. REv. 857 (1985). However, it
is more difficult in the context of disability discrimination because, unlike gender,
disability was historically a medical concept.
216. See Matthew B. Schiff & David L. Miller, The Americans with Disabilities
Act: A New Challenge for Employers, 27 ToRT & INs. L.J. 44,44-48 (1991).
217. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994).
218. See Ilana De Bare, Making Accommodations: Employers Dealing with
Mental Illness in Wake of Federal Disability Law, S.F. Chron., Sept. 8, 1997, at
B1, BI (quoting one attorney as saying "'[w]e've got to integrate as many as five
different laws-the ADA, workers' comp, long-term disability leave, voluntary
paid leave policies, and the Family and Medical Leave Act"').
219. 42 F.3d 503 (9th Cir. 1994).
220. See id. at 506. The intersection of disability and sexual harassment and
abuse is one which has escaped attention although it is clear that disabled women
disproportionately suffer sexual assault, abuse and harassment. See Judith I. Av-
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sign language-to perform sexual acts.' The forced sexual acts and
her fear of communicating with anyone at work about them resulted
in Nichols experiencing severe emotional distress.' The emotional
distress and her aversion to sex because of the harassment caused her
marriage to deteriorate.' Her supervisor forced her to perform oral
sex before he would give her a two week leave of absence when her
husband began divorce proceedings.m Nichols was subsequently di-
agnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder for which she received
disability benefits under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act
(FECA),2m the federal equivalent of worker's compensation.22 When
she sued her employer for sex discrimination and won, the employer
appealed on the grounds that her disability benefits were the exclu-
sive remedy under FECA for her workplace injuries.'
The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument with rather strained le-
gal reasoning, finding that Nichols's post-traumatic stress disorder
was distinguishable from the impact of sex discrimination.' The
court found that the former was "a disease proximately caused by her
employment," but underscored that the latter was not."9 The court
pointed out that it would be inequitable to restrict Nichols to her dis-
ability benefits-which were seventy-five percent of her pay-while
awarding a claimant under identical circumstances who did not suffer
from PTSD full back pay.m This is certainly true, but still results in
the court explicitly constructing the plaintiff's extreme distress at
being forced to have sex into a "disease" which was somehow sepa-
rable from the injury of sex discrimination. The problem in Nichols
is that her experience as she lived it could not be parsed into separate
categories: being deaf-mute was integral to her sexual harassment;
her emotional anguish at being forced to have sex was intensified by
the fact that the only person she could communicate with at work was
the supervisor who was forcing her to have sex.
ner, Sexual Harassment: Building a Consensus for Change, 3 KAN. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 57, 64-65 (1994).




225. 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8193 (1994).
226. See Nichols, 42 F.3d at 506.
227. See id. at 515.
228. See id. at 515-16.
229. Id The Ninth Circuit based its conclusion that post-traumatic stress dis-
order was a disease on the fact that it is a diagnosis in the Diagnostic and Statisti-
cal Manual of the American Psychiatric Association. See id. at 515.
230. See id. at 515-16.
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These cases implicate intersectionality concerns"l and are more
complex than the current structure of legal claims permits. The inter-
sectionality implicates both the experience of the individual and the
discriminating attitudes faced by the individual. For example, harm-
ful and mistaken stereotypes about African-Americans may include
laziness or, in the case of African-American males, violence. Harm-
ful and mistaken stereotypes about people with learning disabilities
or mental illness may also include assumptions that people with these
disabilities are lazy or violent. Thus, the kind of discrimination that
an African-American with a learning disability or a mental illness ex-
periences may be either more easily triggered or more intense be-
cause the two stereotypes operate to reinforce each other. The kinds
of stereotypes that operate against women in general include as-
sumptions about irrationality and emotionalism. Therefore, employ-
ers may regard women more readily as psychiatrically disabled; on
the other hand, employers may take women's reports of psychiatric
disability less seriously.
Whether concurrent or cause and effect, it is clear that in the real
life of workers, sexual or racial harassment is inextricably intertwined
with stress, anxiety, and depression, in a dynamic that drains the
worker and whose accumulated effects may drive him or her into
temporary or permanent psychiatric disability. Any claim for disabil-
ity benefits, however, may erase or at least threaten the discrimina-
tion claim.'
231. Intersectionality describes the way in which the experiences of individuals
who belong to two or more marginalized or minority groups are not reflected in
the paradigms that describe discrimination for any of the groups. These indi-
viduals are doubly or triply burdened by being subjected to the dominant prac-
tices of several different hierarchies, without legal recourse or even narrative de-
scription of their experiences. For example, as conceptualized by Kimberle
Crenshaw, black women find themselves at the intersection of race and gender
discrimination. See Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of
Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Femi-
nist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 139, 140; Kimberle
Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence
Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REv. 1241, 1242-44 (1991). In this case,
Nichols was subject to the intersection of gender, physical, and psychiatric dis-
ability; there is no legal structure available that encompasses the damage and in-
juries she suffered.
232. For some time, courts appeared to be heading towards a per se rule that
any claim for disability benefits created an irrebutable presumption that a plain-
tiff was not a qualified employee. See, e.g., McNemar v. Disney Store, Inc., 91
F.3d 610, 619 (3rd Cir. 1996). However, carefully written court decisions and
EEOC policy guidance explaining the difference between the definitions of dis-
ability for disability benefits purposes and ADA purposes appear to have slowed
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Thus, discrimination law as it currently exists has no mechanism
for dealing with the cumulative or synergistic effects of different
kinds of discrimination, and in fact further disadvantages individuals
who suffer several kinds of discrimination. An individual with a dis-
ability who is a member of an ethnic minority may not even know the
source of adverse treatment by an employer and, indeed, to assume
that this is knowable, identifiable, or separable into distinct catego-
ries is an assumption that may be mistaken.
4. "The employee is ill-suited in temperament or skill for the job and
this poor fit will necessarily create stress"
This statement clearly describes the stress that many people feel
in their jobs, but it appears to describe only a few of the cases
brought by people with psychiatric disabilities under the ADA.23 As
noted at the beginning of this Article, most of the plaintiffs in these
cases are well-qualified to perform the technical aspects of their jobs.
The problem presented in cases involving people with psychiatric dis-
abilities, unlike cases involving people with physical disabilities, is
rarely whether they can do the job itself. As stated by one court in a
case involving psychiatric disability: "[the plaintiff] incorrectly as-
sumes that the essential functions of the job of shift electrician re-
quire only technical ability and experience as an electrician."' 4 Un-
der most circumstances, people with psychiatric disabilities choose
jobs carefully, precisely to get "a good fit." 5 Therefore, it is rarely
the case that the stress felt by these plaintiffs arises from their lack of
skill. It arises, rather, from interpersonal difficulties or from being
asked to perform for too many hours.
The court in Dewitt v. Carsten 6 opened its opinion by laying out
down this general trend. See, e.g., Talavera v. School Bd., 129 F.3d 1214, 1216-21
(11th Cir. 1997); Weigel v. Target Stores, 122 F.3d 461, 463-69 (7th Cir. 1997);
Swanks v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 116 F.3d 582, 584-87 (D.C.
Cir. 1997); Robinson v. Neodata Servs., Inc., 94 F.3d 499, 502 n.2 (8th Cir. 1996);
Enforcement Guidance on the Effect of Representations Made in Applications for
Benefits on the Determination of Whether a Person is 'a Qualified Individual with
a Disability' Under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 3 EEOC Compl.
Man. (BNA) § 2281 (Feb. 1997).
233. See Johnston v. Morrison, 849 F. Supp. 777, 778-79 (N.D. Ala. 1994)
(noting that waitress who could not handle pressure of working on crowded
nights or memorizing frequent menu changes was not qualified to perform es-
sential functions of the job).
234. Grenier v. Cyanamid Plastics, Inc., 70 F.3d 667, 674 (1st Cir. 1995).
235. MANcUSO, supra note 183, at 35.
236. 941 F. Supp. 1232 (N.D. Ga. 1996), affd mem., 122 F.3d 1079 (11th Cir.
1997).
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all possible sources of stress on the job but ultimately did not pursue
this line of reasoning. The plaintiff claimed that the boss's yelling at
her and her working with jail inmates caused her stress, two very
distinct sources of stress according to the court's own rubric. How-
ever, the court simply concluded that stress was not a disability and
that "an employer may not be required to transfer a stressed, dissat-
isfied employee." 8 Thus, in Dewitt, the court joined all other courts,
which treat "stress" as a macro-concept without regard to its origin,
cause, or interaction with disability. It effectively declared that toler-
ating stress was an essential function of all jobs, and that transfer to
ameliorate stress would never be a reasonable accommodation.
IV. USING THE ADA TO ATTACK OBJECTIVELY ABUSIVE OR
UNREASONABLY STRESSFUL WORKPLACE ENVIRONMENTS
Employment discrimination against persons with psychiatric dis-
abilities is not primarily about exclusion from job opportunities be-
cause of myths about mental illness. Rather, it is about the disparate
impact of the extremes of abuse and stress in the American workplace
on people with psychiatric disabilities."' Just as an employer's failure
to have an elevator or accessible bathroom hinders a person in a
wheelchair from performing a job, an employer's antagonistic, hos-
tile, or extremely stressful work environment prevents a person with
a psychiatric disability from performing a job that the person is
qualified to perform and is completely capable of performing.
Neither the absence of an accessible bathroom nor the presence
of a hostile and abusive environment necessarily indicates intentional
hostility toward people with disabilities. However, the ADA prohib-
its actions with a disparate impact on disabled people.' Both the
failure to provide accessible bathrooms and the presence of an abu-
sive environment operate to exclude people with particular disabili-
ties.
237. See id. at 1234.
238. Id. at 1237.
239. When I underscore extremes, I wish to emphasize that I am not discussing
a plaintiff who perceives slights and takes offense where others would not. I am
discussing an individual whose reaction to conduct and conditions that all em-
ployees would characterize as upsetting and offensive is disabling to that individ-
ual.
240. See infra text accompanying notes 240-49.
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A. Abusive Workplaces Have a Disparate Impact on Individuals with
Psychiatric Disabilities
Disparate impact discrimination is prohibited under the ADA.
The statute defines discrimination to include "utilizing standards, cri-
teria, or methods of administration that have the effect of discrimi-
nation on the basis of disability... or that perpetuate the discrimina-
tion of others who are subject to common administrative control."2 1
The legislative history of the ADA confirms that Congress fully
intended to prohibit disparate impact discrimination. The legislative
history of the ADA states that "[d]iscrimination results from actions
or inactions that discriminate by effect as well as by intent or de-
sign."242 Specifically, the Senate Committee Report explaining the
meaning of "discrimination" for Title I declared: "[s]ubparagraphs
(B) and (C) incorporate a disparate impact standard to ensure that
the legislative mandate to end discrimination does not ring hollow.
This standard is consistent with the interpretation of section 504 by
the U.S. Supreme Court in Alexander v. Choate.' 24U If there were any
doubt remaining as to the viability of a disparate impact cause of ac-
tion under Title I of the ADA, it was removed by the passage of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991,. which, in providing for compensatory and
punitive damages for intentional discrimination under Title I of the
ADA, specifically distinguishes such a claim from "an employment
practice that is unlawful because of its disparate impact. '
In addition, most circuit courts acknowledge the existence of a
cause of action under the ADA based on disparate impact,2' al-
though it is rarely invoked, and even more rarely invoked in em-
ployment discrimination cases.4 7 However, it is clear that "the
241. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(3) (1994).
242. S. REP. No. 101-116, at 6 (1989). The equivalent House report contains
identical language. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 29 (1990), reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303,310.
243. S. REP. No. 101-116, at 30. Again, the equivalent House report contains
identical language. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 61, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 343. In Alexander v. Choate, the Supreme Court "reject[ed] the
boundless notion that all disparate impact showings constitute prima facie cases
under § 504." 469 U.S. 287,299 (1985).
244. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 2 U.S.C., 16 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
245. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(2) (1994).
246. See, e.g., Matthews v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 128 F.3d 1194, 1195-96
(7th Cir. 1997); Monette v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1178 & n.5
(6th Cir. 1996); Helen L. v. Didario, 46 F.3d 325, 335 (3d Cir. 1995).
247. When disparate impact cases are brought under the ADA, they are al-
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Americans with Disabilities Act requires employers to eliminate os-
tensibly neutral barriers that disparately impact the disabled." 248
If a facially neutral practice, such as an objectively abusive work
environment, operates to exclude psychiatrically disabled employees,
and an employee requests that abusiveness be minimized as a rea-
sonable accommodation, the law requires employers to reasonably
accommodate disabled individuals unless such accommodation im-
poses an undue hardship.249 Furthermore, employers must eliminate
qualification standards or job requirements that disparately disadvan-
tage the disabled unless such requirements are job-related and con-
sistent with business necessity.'
Although this is a claim about hostile work environments, it is
not, in this particular iteration,' a hostile work environment claim in
the technical sense. While the Supreme Court has recognized the
right to work in an environment free from intimidation, insult, and
ridicule based on one's membership in a protected class,1 2 this is a far
cry from recognizing a right to work in an environment free from
free-ranging, universally applicable intimidation, insult, and ridi-
cule.2'3 Hostile environment claims are another form of the inten-
tional discrimination, or disparate treatment claim. While hostile
environment claims have been recognized under the ADA, they re-
quire animus against disabled people, or against the plaintiff indi-
vidually because of his or her disability.
Yet cases where the supervisor is explicitly hostile to the disabil-
ity, although they certainly exist, are less frequent than cases where
the supervisor is exempt from liability precisely because he or she
exhibits hostility indiscriminately. One court noted, "[plaintiff's su-
pervisor] denies ever having harassed the plaintiff or having discrimi-
most always brought as Title II or Title III cases against state or local govern-
ments. See, e.g., Crowder v. Kitagawa, 81 F.3d 1480, 1483-84 (9th Cir. 1996); In-
mates of Alleghany County Jail v. Wecht, 93 F.3d 1124, No. 95-3402, 1996 WL
474106, at *5 (3d Cir.), vacated, 93 F.3d 1146 (3d Cir. 1996); Helen L., 46 F.3d at
331-32; Wolford v. Lewis, 860 F. Supp. 1123, 1134 (S.D. W.Va. 1994) (involving
claims under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act).
248. Monette, 90 F.3d at 1178 n.5.
249. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A); Monette, 90 F.3d at 1179.
250. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6); Monette, 90 F.3d at 1179.
251. See infra text accompanying notes 258-61.
252. See Meritor Says. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65-66 (1986).
253. Indeed the Supreme Court has just underscored that Title VII provides
no constraints against such environments. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998).
254. See Haysman v. Food Lion, Inc., 893 F. Supp. 1092, 1106-07 (S.D. Ga.
1995); see also cases cited supra note 185.
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nated against him in any way. The record indicates that [the supervi-
sor] did express hostility toward her subordinates, but that she did so
indiscriminately." ' Another court noted "the fact that black em-
ployees and non-handicapped employees complained of the same
kind of bullying and harassment makes it difficult for the court to
find a discriminatory motivation behind the undeniably bad treat-
ment [plaintiff] received." 6
Although judges in some of these cases have indicated that the
plaintiff produced clear evidence that the abusive work environment
had a much greater impact on him or her than on other employees
because of his or her disability, at least one judge required the plain-
tiff to specifically request that the abuse be curtailed as a reasonable
accommodation to his disability. This was required even though
the employer was particularly-even uniquely-well situated to be
aware of the disparate impact of its treatment on the plaintiff:
It is clearly the case that plaintiff, because of his PTSD, was
unusually sensitive to the bullying management style of his
... supervisors. This might be viewed as raising an issue of
accommodation. While one would expect management at a
veterans hospital to be aware of and sensitive to the diffi-
culties experienced by veterans with Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder, the record suggests that at no time did plaintiff
and his doctors make a real effort to educate management
adequately about PTSD .... Given the difficulties of trying
to accommodate an employee whose disability is aggravated
by job-related stress, the court believes more was required
of [the plaintiff] than a generalized complaint about work-
ing conditions to immediate supervisors to trigger an obli-
gation on defendant's part to accommodatef 8
However, as will be seen below, even employees' specific re-
quests to lower the level of hostility at work because of its deleterious
effect on a disability has not succeeded with some courts.
255. Mazarella v. United States Postal Serv., 849 F. Supp. 89, 91-92 (D. Mass.
1994) (citations omitted).
256. Pavone v. Brown, No. 95-C-3620, 1997 WL 441312, at *9 (N.D. Ill. July 29,
1997).
257. See id. at *8.
258. IL
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B. Disparate Treatment: Ending Workplace Abuse as a Reasonable
Accomodation
The disparate impact model shades quickly into the disparate
treatment model if the employee requests a less abusive workplace as
a reasonable accommodation to his or her disability, and is denied
that request. While an employer may not intentionally discriminate
against people with psychiatric disabilities by maintaining an abusive
or unnecessarily stressful work environment, intentional discrimina-
tion may come into play if an employer is made aware of the impact
of workplace abuse on an employee-and the nexus between work-
place conditions and the employee's disability-and refuses to make
any changes.
In a few cases where plaintiffs have identified themselves as be-
ing disabled, and asked for accommodations such as "a nonhostile
working environment,"' " or "softer management approaches,""'
courts have not shown that they comprehend the connection between
psychiatric disability and a hostile work environment. For example,
one court noted the plaintiff:
has provided nothing to show that even if she were a quali-
fied individual with a disability [the defendant] failed to
make reasonable accommodations for her.
In regard to her second request for accommodation, the re-
cord shows that at the civil service hearing she merely asked
for a non-hostile working environment. Even if this could
be considered a genuine request for accommodation for her
mental condition involving panic attacks and stress, it oc-
curred about 11h years after her suspension and long after
she filed this complaint-and that was way too late.21
While race discrimination and gender discrimination laws have
not eliminated racism and sexism from the workplace, they have es-
tablished a common understanding that such behavior is unaccept-
able. Because of public education and litigation, employers now per-
ceive that the employee who sexually harasses another employee or
makes racist remarks or jokes is the problem employee, rather than
the employee who is harassed or is the butt of the racist jokes.
259. Hunt-Gofliday v. Metropolitan Water Reclamation Dist., 104 F.3d 1004,
1013 (7th Cir. 1997).
260. Boldini v. Postmaster Gen., 928 F. Supp. 125, 131 (D.N.H. 1995).
261. See Hunt-Golliday, 104 F.3d at 1012-13 (emphasis added).
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The same transformation of understanding must take place with
regard to the supervisor who is harsh or abusive to his or her employ-
ees. Presently, it is the employee who is viewed as having the prob-
lem, as being "too fragile" to work, even in the face of extensive and
excellent work histories. The stressful or abusive workplace is still
commonly defended as the employer's prerogative.
Making working conditions more pleasant or less abusive may
appear to be far less expensive than the accommodations required for
physically disabled employees. However, any suggestion that these
ameliorative measures are required by the ADA is fiercely resisted
by employers and dismissed out-of-hand by courts. Requiring such
changes in working conditions threatens deeply held beliefs about
employer prerogatives far more than building ramps or installing
TTY telephones. As has been aptly noted by the foremost empirical
researcher into the costs and consequences of the ADA, resistance to
the ADA is far more a matter of the culture of the employment envi-
ronment than it is a matter of expense.22 Rather than protect work-
ers with psychiatric disabilities, courts have wholeheartedly protected
employer prerogatives in this area. As one court stated, "[f]orcing
transfers of employees under the guise of reasonably accommodating
employees under the ADA inherently would undermine an em-
ployer's ability to control its own labor force.,
263
Yet the disparate impact of objectively abusive supervisors on
people with psychiatric disabilities exists and can be established fairly
easily through empirical literature and expert testimony.
Furthermore, the remedies requested--either the cessation of su-
pervisor abuse or the transfer of the employee-already comport with
good management practice. Controlling the abusive supervisor is an
accommodation that will benefit all employees in the workplace, and is
unlikely to create resentment among the disabled employee's co-
workers. It is difficult to justify refusal to transfer a qualified person
with a disability, a remedy routinely granted for others-such as vic-
tims of sexual harassment-as anything but discrimination. Since
courts routinely order transfer as a reasonable accommodation for
people with physical disabilities, the reluctance of the courts to order
transfer in psychiatric disability cases cannot simply be characterized as
unwillingness to interfere with managerial prerogatives in this area.
262. See, e.g., Barbara Presley Noble, A Level Playing Field, for Just $121,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1995, at 21 (quoting Peter Blanck).
263. Lewis v. Zilog, Inc., 908 F. Supp. 931, 948 (N.D. Ga. 1995).
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C. Unnecessarily Stressful Environments and Disparate Impact on
People with Psychiatric Disabilities
As noted above, stress is a far more complex subject than work-
place abuse. First, workplace abuse in its most extreme forms is con-
crete and tangible-supervisors screaming, throwing things, hitting
employees-and is universally experienced as unpleasant and offen-
sive by workers. Stress, however, is rarely tangible in a similar way.
Most sources of stress, even long working hours, are experienced dif-
ferently by different workers. Different workers with psychiatric dis-
abilities will find different experiences stressful, and require different
accommodations.
Second, it is difficult for the employer to point to any benefit
that abusive supervisors provide for his or her enterprise. To the ex-
tent that stress results from causes other than workplace abuse, it
more directly implicates core business functions. Because of down-
sizing, employees are being asked to take on more responsibility and
work longer hours, and this is directly connected to some of the diffi-
culties employees with psychiatric disabilities are experiencing.
Furthermore, there are few existing legal principles that tell us
the threshold beyond which no one should be expected to work. Non-
professional employees may be entitled to overtime pay, but they
may also be forced to work overtime. Union agreements tend to fo-
cus on how much notice must be given before an employee is re-
quired to work overtime, and whether the extra pay should be time
and a half or double time.' There are very few cases dealing directly
with the amount of work an employer can expect of an employee
with a psychiatric disability. In one case involving claims under a
state disability discrimination law, an attorney with depression won
$300,000 in damages-and $800,000 in attorney fees-in an arbitra-
tion award after his employer refused his request for one-half-day a
week off every time he worked two consecutive weeks in a row of
more than forty-five hours a week.25
In order to prove an employment discrimination case based on
disparate impact under the ADA, a plaintiff must show "that the
employer has fixed a qualification that bears more heavily on dis-
abled than on other workers and is not required by the necessities of
264. See generally BNA, BASIC PATrERNs IN UNION CONTRACrs (14th ed.
1995).
265. See Stevens, supra note 33, at B1 (reporting on Putnam v. Pacific Gas &
Electric, No. C-9403558-WHO (N.D. Cal. 1995)).
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the business or activity in question." ' An employer may maintain
discriminatory practices only if it can be proven that to change these
practices would "impose an undue hardship."' 7  It is difficult to
imagine courts conducting the kind of review necessary to determine
whether employers' specific downsizing decisions, or massive layoffs
leading to greatly increased hours and responsibilities for the remain-
ing workers, were "necessary." In addition, unlike the case of con-
trolling the abusive supervisor, accommodations in the form of re-
quiring fewer hours of work from the psychiatrically disabled
employee will likely lead to resentment on the part of co-workers
who do not receive this accommodation, and that resentment itself
may trigger more stress for the employee than working excessive
hours. The task of formulating an appropriate conceptual approach
to workplace stress caused by excessive hours is beyond the scope of
this Article, but it must be done.
In the past, an employee's vulnerability to stress or highly un-
pleasant workplace conditions simply established that the employee
could not work, and he or she was fired or quit. The lucky people re-
ceived disability benefits. The advent of the ADA requires a reex-
amination of who should take responsibility for readjustment of the
workplace.
V. CONCLUSION
The last decade has seen massive corporate mergers and down-
sizing, with escalating worker hours and increasing stress on the job.
Managers and supervisors may be more likely to take out their own
work pressures on employees. Workers who are dependent on em-
ployment in a particular location or trying to vest pensions may be
relatively powerless to change their circumstances, and the power-
lessness itself may lead to even greater stress. All of this is happen-
ing in workplaces that are increasingly less unionized; unions are in
any event more concerned with preserving employment security and
benefits than in workplace stress and abuse."6
Against this backdrop of the American workplace in the nine-
ties, it should not come as a surprise that employment discrimination
claims involving psychiatric disabilities are growing rapidly. Skilled
266. Matthews v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 128 F.3d 1194, 1195-96 (7th Cir.
1997).
267. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (1994).
268. See generally BASIC PATrERNs IN UNION CONTRACTs, supra note 264.
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and talented workers are being pushed beyond the limits of their en-
durance and are fighting back in the only way left to many of them.
These workers embody the purposes of the ADA in some ways: they
are qualified for their jobs, the accommodations they request do not
cost money and would lead to a more productive work force in gen-
eral if implemented.
But these employees are losing their ADA cases because abuse
and stress are seen as simply intrinsic to employment, as invisible and
inseparable from conditions of employment as sexual harassment was
twenty years ago. While apparently the notion that employers are
entitled to create a hostile, abusive environment as long as the hostil-
ity is generalized and the abuse is universal still predominates, a more
careful examination and articulation of the principles of the ADA
suggests that such environments have a substantial disparate impact
on people with psychiatric disabilities-who are losing opportunities
for employment due to practices that have no productive value for
the employer.
While extremely abusive environments-for example, constantly
screaming or assaultive supervisors-are easy to identify and difficult
to justify, stress in the workplace represents an entirely different and
more complex set of issues for disability law. It is clear that, except
for abusive work environments, no single set of circumstances-not
even extremely long hours-are uniformly experienced as stressful by
workers. Indeed, an environment of respect and collegiality probably
would cushion some of the stress associated with long hours. What is
clear from examining the cases brought under the ADA is that courts
must begin to parse out the source of stress in deciding whether a
worker's ability to withstand it is indeed an "essential function" of
the specific job the employee is being asked to do.
Likewise, courts should follow the lead of Judge Posner in look-
ing to the manifestations rather than the etiology of disability in de-
termining whether the plaintiff is disabled under the ADA. People
can drive each other crazy; hostile, abusive treatment can trigger un-
derlying vulnerabilities; extraordinary stress can be the final straw
that breaks the worker's back.
Ultimately, integrating skilled people with psychiatric disabilities
in the workplace may require that employers have more responsibil-
ity to ensure a respectful and non-abusive workplace free of unneces-
sary stress. Almost all of the accommodations required by people
with psychiatric disabilities are uncontroversially accepted as good
managerial and personnel practice in the business world. Treating
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employees with dignity and respect, curbing unnecessary stress, re-
solving supervisor-employee friction, and promoting flexibility in re-
sponse to the individual needs of employees will not only accommo-
date people with psychiatric disabilities but will also work to the
advantage of everyone in the workplace.
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